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Defining Terms and Review of Literature 
 This thesis examines the role of the diaspora, as defined below, in the strength and 
success of national secessionist movements in Kosovo and Tatarstan. The gaps in the literature 
provide sufficient space for a qualitative study that intends to further explore the relationship 
between co-ethnic diaspora communities and national secessionist movements in the homeland. 
Utilizing four measures of diaspora engagement, this paper hypothesizes that higher diaspora 
engagement with the independence movement increases the likelihood of the success of the 
movement. After testing this hypothesis against different kinds of data systematically gathered 
from multiple sources, this paper finds that the high engagement of the Kosovar Albanian 
diaspora strengthened the Kosovo independence campaign, while the lack of engagement from 
the Volga Tatar diaspora weakened the Tatarstan independence campaign. 
 In the following section, I outline important definitions for this paper and review previous 
exploration of the relationship between secessionist movements and the diaspora. In the second 
chapter, I outline the measurements and data for each variable. In the third chapter, I utilize 
process tracing to discuss the Kosovo independence movement as a case study, followed by the 
Tatarstan independence movement as a case study in chapter four. 
 
Definition of Diaspora: 
 Due to the high number of conflicting studies on this question, each with a different 
definition of diaspora, a general consensus regarding the definition of “diaspora” must be 
reached for this research project. For the majority of the literature, definitions of diaspora are 
broken into two camps, the primordial camp, which generally believes that diasporas form 
naturally from migration, and the constructivist camp, which generally believes that diasporas 
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form from co-ethnic social mobilization. In other words, there is disagreement whether diasporas 
form naturally from ethnic migrant communities or form as a result of ethnic activists or political 
elites who actively construct their identity. Both camps agree that diasporas are highly case-
specific and difficult to generalize, resulting in the necessity for a strong working definition. I 
will provide a brief background on each camp, then explain the choice for the definition of 
“diaspora” in this thesis and outline the operating definition that will inform the remainder of this 
project. 
Both camps agree on the historical and classical definition of a “diaspora,” which was 
reserved solely for Jews, Armenians and Greeks driven from their homeland and dispersed 
around the world. These diasporas are assumed to have had the eventual goal of reinstating and 
returning to their perceived home (Brubaker 2005, Tololyan 1996, Safran 1991). Also referred to 
as “victim diasporas,” the dispersed Armenians, Jews and Greeks followed similar patterns of 
forced or coerced removal from their homeland in repeated instances throughout history. This 
was followed by general persecution even in their temporary host countries, creating ethnically-
distinguished, culturally-resilient and politically-motivated communities focused on creating 
their own “promised land.” In this context, the “promised land” referred to a reclaiming of their 
self-identified homeland, as the Jewish diaspora sought to return to Israel and Judea, the 
Armenian diaspora sought to reclaim the Armenian highlands and the Greek diaspora sought to 
reclaim Byzantium and Western Anatolia. In these instances, the reclaimed “homeland” does 
historically coincide with areas that were once occupied by that ethnicity, even if there are no 
longer any members of that ethnicity in the region. These historical claims often go back 
millennia and the “right” to a territory based on historical ties is largely self-identified by leaders 
in the diaspora community. For example, following the Armenian genocide in 1915, the 
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Armenian population in eastern Anatolia was decimated; however, Eastern Anatolia is still 
considered to be “historic” Armenia by groups within the Armenian diaspora due to the cultural 
and historical ties to the region, in spite of the lack of ethnic Armenians living there today 
(Tololyan 1996). The similar histories of these diasporas contributed to a classical definition of 
diaspora as “victim diasporas.” 
However, with the rise of independence and nationalist movements following the breakup 
of the Soviet Union, the use of the word diaspora resurfaced and began to take more colloquial 
definitions in both academic and public speech. The term “diaspora” has expanded in recent 
years to mean nearly any dispersed population, ranging from other groups that faced coerced 
dispersion, such as refugee groups; to voluntary dispersion, such as ex-patriates; to shared 
identities of marginalized peoples, such as the “LGBTQ diaspora.” As a result, the term 
“diaspora” is under threat of concept stretching, where the definition becomes so vague that the 
term becomes meaningless (Baser and Swain 2010). 
This is where the camps diverge. Despite noting that the definition of diaspora is under 
threat of meaninglessness, Baser and Swain (2010, 39) follow a constructivist route, arguing that 
“[a diaspora] is an elite mobilized political project, and diaspora identity is constructed, rather 
than a natural result of mass migration.” Their argument is fairly simple. A diaspora is not any 
ethnic community, but rather a group of political activists that seek to affect change in the 
homeland through co-ethnic transnational mobilization. Through this definition, political goals 
matter more to a diaspora than ethnic identity, though ethnic identity is a necessary condition for 
membership to the diaspora. Other definitions focus on this point. Adamson (2012, 28) argues 
that “‘diasporas’ are best viewed as products or outcomes of transnational mobilization activities 
by political entrepreneurs engaged in strategic social identity construction.” Demmers (2002) and 
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Anderson (1983) describe diasporas as “imagined political communities,” where the 
communities are entirely “de-localized” in favor of transnational social movements without a 
clear center, but oriented toward achieving political goals in the homeland community. To 
briefly summarize this dense literature, constructivists state that diasporas are transnational 
political movements that form as a result of activities initiated by certain political elite that share 
ethnic identity. 
 In the other camp, primordialists believe that diasporas form naturally from migration, 
although not every ethnic migrant community can be considered a diaspora. Some primordialists, 
such as Walker Connor (1986), define “diaspora” in simple terms, stating that a diaspora is “the 
segment of people living outside their homeland.” In this definition, the homeland is self-defined 
by the “segment of people”; however, their connection and relation to their homeland remains 
undefined. In contrast to this, Safran (1991) notes six defining characteristics of diasporas, four 
of which define relation to the homeland. Safran’s defining characteristics are as follows: a 
diaspora population must be dispersed from a specific, original “center” to two or more 
periphery regions; must retain a collective memory or myth about the original homeland; is not 
or cannot be fully accepted by the host country; must regard ancestral home as a place to return 
to or as a true, ideal home; maintains a belief in the necessity to collectively maintain or support 
the homeland; and finally, the ethno-communal consciousness and solidarity of the diaspora 
must be defined through their relationship to the homeland. Many (incl. Clifford 1994) posit that 
Safran’s definition may be too strict, as his characterizations limit the definition to only a few 
groups, including the Jewish, Armenian and Greek diasporas. Despite the limitations to Safran’s 
definition, his key point is that the active relationship between homeland and diaspora is 
definitional to a diaspora community. Tololyan (1996) also notes that diasporas “actively 
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maintain a collective memory about the homeland,” maintain communal boundaries between 
themselves and the host country and keep in contact with other co-ethnics and the homeland. 
Tololyan believes that diasporas form naturally from migration; however, the active retention of 
a collective memory is reinforced through constructed institutions, such as cultural centers, 
religious institutions or simply through education at home. As a result, Tololyan’s argument is 
predominantly primordialist with aspects of institutionalized identity construction in line with a 
constructivist argument. 
 Brubaker (2005) summarizes these points shared between Connor, Sheffer (1986), 
Safran and Tololyan into a cogent working definition for diaspora that contains three 
components: a “diaspora” must be dispersed through space, maintain social boundaries between 
itself and the host country and orient itself towards the homeland. This triad of dispersion, social 
boundary-maintenance and homeland orientation captures the essential differences between a 
diaspora community and an ethnic migrant community, while still allowing for new communities 
to become diasporic. In sum, this definition is neither too strict nor too inclusive, allowing for 
new diasporas to form without allowing general migration patterns to be included in diasporan 
measurement. Brubaker’s definition will provide the groundwork for this thesis. 
 Why is a primordialist-dominated definition more suited for this paper? There are four 
reasons that constructivist definitions of “diaspora” seem misguided. Firstly, most constructivist 
definitions do not include homeland orientation, a necessity for studying the relationship 
between diasporas and secession. Without a defined homeland, a collective identity is difficult to 
construct and social movements would have different goals, though many constructivists 
continue to posit that the “LGBT transnational community” or “Muslim transnational 
community” are diasporas, despite a clear lack of a Muslim or LGBT homeland. Secondly, 
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actions common to maintaining a diasporan identity between co-ethnic communities do not have 
to be part of a broader social movement, but should be included as diasporan activities because 
they maintain connection to the homeland. This includes speaking in a native language or 
contributing to cultural or historical institutions, which allow for boundary maintenance and may 
orient the speaker to the native homeland, without directly taking a political stance. Thirdly, by 
framing all diasporas as politically-oriented transnational social movements, any measure of 
diasporan activity in the homeland will be inherently skewed towards political activity. If all 
diasporas are defined as inherently political, then the diaspora will affect all political movements 
within the homeland, obscuring any objective study into the true effect of transnational co-
ethnics on the homeland. Finally, co-ethnic diasporas may have different political objectives, 
such as Zionist Jews and non-Zionist Jews in Europe prior to the establishment of Israel. In the 
constructivist definition, would the Zionist diaspora be separate from the Jewish diaspora? If the 
answer is yes, this argument seems like a severe misunderstanding of co-ethnic communities. In 
sum, to gain a more accurate definition of diaspora and to understand the varying impact of 
diaspora on secessionist movements, constructivist definitions of diaspora will not be utilized in 
this paper. 
To further extrapolate on the working definition of “diaspora,” as utilized by Brubaker, I 
have summarized his argument in a few paragraphs, supplemented by other primordialist 
arguments and Tololyan’s constructivist elements. 
Firstly, a diaspora must be dispersed through space. This is a broad qualification, but a 
diaspora includes members from the entire dispersed ethnic population. There is some debate 
whether the dispersion qualification includes intrastate or solely interstate dispersion, as 
diasporas historically refer to dispersion outside the homeland, which may not be fully 
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encapsulated by state lines. For the sake of this paper, intrastate dispersion, such as internally 
displaced persons, will not be counted as part of the diaspora to preserve the importance of the 
triangle relationship between host country, diaspora and homeland (Safran 1991). Host countries 
inherently treat citizens or residents, such as internally displaced persons (IDPs), differently than 
transnational co-ethnics, adding a further complication in the host-diaspora relationship. 
Additionally, while an internally displaced individual may be outside their homeland, but still 
within the same country that their traditional homeland is a part of, they are still subject to the 
same laws and regulations, constraining their ability to connect to and act along with the rest of 
the diaspora. For example, an Iranian Kurd who is displaced to Tehran from Iranian Kurdistan is 
not yet a member of the Iranian Kurdish diaspora, as (s)he is still subject to Iranian policies that 
limit Kurdish cultural practices and political activity. These limitations and that individual’s 
removal from the homeland, where the majority of connection between homeland and diaspora 
occurs, lead to difficulties connecting with the diaspora community. While intrastate dispersed 
populations often behave as a diaspora and fit Brubaker’s definitions of dispersion, the 
complicated nature of the relationship between ethnic minority citizens of the host country living 
outside their homeland and the host country changes the triangle relationship between diasporas, 
the homeland and the host country too drastically to be included in this paper. In sum, the first 
definitional characteristic of a diaspora is that a diaspora is dispersed through space outside of 
the country that includes the homeland. 
 Secondly, a diaspora must have a homeland orientation. Safran (1991) expands on this 
definition in his qualifications, stating that a diaspora has a collective memory about perceived 
homeland, views its homeland as an “ideal” home or a place to eventually return, is committed to 
the maintenance and restoration of the homeland and relates to the homeland in a way that 
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shapes the collective diaspora’s identity. While Safran’s definition of diaspora is too limiting for 
this paper, the key to understanding homeland orientation is the consensus about the general 
borders of the homeland, which the diaspora largely defines for itself, and an emotional or 
identifying characteristic of the relationship between diaspora and homeland. In many instances, 
the identifying characteristic of the connection between diaspora and homeland is emotional, 
such as a collective memory about genocide, but other identifying characteristics can drive the 
relationship, such as a unique shared religion with elements rooted in the physical homeland. As 
Tololyan (1996) notes, these qualifiers separate a diaspora from an “ethnic community” residing 
in another country, as members of a diaspora actively and intentionally work towards supporting 
the home country, rather than simply sending home remittances or attending cultural events. 
Safran notes that this excludes the Roma population from being included in a diaspora, due to the 
lack of perceived “homeland” amongst the Roma. In sum, the second definitional characteristic 
of a diaspora is that a diaspora is oriented towards the homeland through a collective emotional 
or unique identifying characteristic. 
 Finally, diasporas practice social boundary-maintenance. Through either a collective 
unwillingness to assimilate or social exclusion in the host country that forces a lack of 
assimilation, diasporas are not fully included as members of the host country. Despite sometimes 
being citizens of the host country, members of a diaspora distinguish themselves from the 
general populace culturally, religiously or socially. This segregation or self-segregation allows 
for a distinctive transnational community, as Armenians in Poland may readily connect with 
Armenians in the United States, forming a diaspora. Brubaker additionally notes that this 
disconnect between the host country and the diaspora must have a time aspect to be considered a 
diaspora, as most immigrant communities take time to adjust, but a generational disconnect 
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qualifies a diaspora. As a result of these general qualifications, the term “diaspora” certainly 
becomes more defined, though more difficult to measure, as ethnic migration measured in most 
censuses is no longer the sole definition of a diasporic community. Active boundary maintenance 
and homeland orientation implies a deeper relation to the homeland than solely blood relations or 
ethnic ties, but rather a mindset that affects certain individuals more than others. Safran (1991) 
notes the difference between “active” and “passive” individuals in a diaspora, noting that passive 
members can be activated, but should not be considered members of the diaspora until they are 
actively involved in boundary maintenance in the host country. This distinction further muddies 
the water for acquiring quantifiable data on diaspora populations, as passive and active members 
are largely self-identified. In sum, the third and final definitional characteristic of a diaspora is 
social boundary maintenance, where the diaspora does not assimilate into the host society either 
by choice or as a result of social exclusion in the host society. 
 While Brubaker does not directly include active participation in the homeland as a 
qualification for a diaspora, Tololyan (1995) and Sheffer (2003) both discuss the importance of 
active membership to a diaspora. Cultural and social activity are part of maintaining cultural 
boundaries and potential connection to the homeland. Sending remittances back to family in the 
homeland, fiscal or social support of political parties or activist groups in the homeland or 
funding cultural and traditional sites in the host country or homeland are common forms of 
“active boundary maintenance” amongst diasporas and prevent full assimilation into the host 
society. Diasporic activity is an important piece to consider when calculating the size or 
influence of a diaspora, as passive members or assimilated members are not included in size or 
engagement estimates of a diaspora. The choice to actively maintain boundaries and resist 
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assimilation as a component of the definition of an engaged diaspora demonstrates some 
constructivist elements to the primarily primordialist definition that will be utilized in this paper. 
 To clearly state the operative definition of diaspora as outlined above, a diaspora must be 
dispersed through space outside of the metropole that contains the homeland, oriented towards 
the homeland through a collective emotional memory or identifying characteristic and 
maintaining social boundaries in the hostland. An engaged diaspora actively maintains social 
boundaries and participates in homeland affairs or in cultural or social activities with members of 
the diaspora in the hostland. 
 
Definition of Diaspora Engagement: 
 In order to create an operable framework for diaspora engagement, political, economic 
and ideological engagement are all considered parts of diaspora engagement. Engagement in 
general speaks to the degree of activity practiced by the diaspora on behalf of the homeland. In 
the case of national secessionist campaigns in the homeland, diaspora engagement with the 
homeland is likely in conjunction with the secessionist campaign and engagement follows pro-
secessionist sentiments. As a result, a member of the diaspora can be considered engaged by 
actively practicing political, economic or ideological engagement or any combination of the 
three forms that supports the homeland. 
 Political engagement is a member of the diaspora’s support of the homeland through 
political means. Political engagement requires a member of the diaspora to act within the 
political sphere, enacting influence on homeland politics, hostland politics or international 
politics. Political activities would include establishing lobby organizations to garner support for 
the diaspora or the homeland, voting in the homeland or in the host country for pro-diaspora 
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candidates or donating to political organizations, campaigns or parties that support the diaspora 
or the homeland. As an example, the Jewish diaspora in the United States is highly politically 
engaged, as a number of pro-Israel lobby organizations exist and some members of the Jewish 
diaspora vote for candidates based on their perceived support of Israel. Lobbying international 
organizations, such as the European Union, is also considered to be political engagement. 
 Economic engagement relates to the economic support between a member of the diaspora 
and the homeland. Sending remittances, investing in infrastructure or businesses in the homeland 
or intentionally engaging in trade with the homeland as a result of ethnic ties are all forms of 
economic engagement. With regard to secessionist campaigns, economic engagement can take 
the form of funding weapon supplies, relief efforts, aid from NGOs or sending remittances to 
family members in the homeland. Each of these forms of economic engagement encourages the 
secessionist movement to continue and marginally strengthens the campaign through economic 
support. 
 Finally, ideological engagement relates to non-economic or political support of the 
homeland by a member of the diaspora. Ideological support for the homeland comes in a number 
of forms, from protesting or demonstrating on behalf of the homeland in the host country to 
producing pro-secessionist media, such as books, film, articles and newspapers, to encouraging 
the success of a secessionist campaign on social media. Ideological support can also come from 
establishing or contributing to co-ethnic cultural or education centers to raise awareness about 
the homeland. Ideological engagement is key to diaspora engagement, as ideological support of 
the homeland or co-ethnic secessionist campaign provides necessary support to fighters in the 
homeland and contributes to the “diasporan mindset,” which will be discussed later. 
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 In addition, not all actions can be perfectly boxed into political, economic or ideological 
engagement, as there is significant overlap between the categories. Activities without a clear 
categorization are still considered as part of diaspora engagement, such as joining a secessionist 
army in the homeland, which is both a political and ideological action. However, the three 
different forms of engagement for members of a diaspora with the homeland will act as a 
framework for understanding the relationship between diasporas and secessionist success. 
 
Definition of Secession and Success: 
 In order to study the relationship between diasporas and the success of secessionist 
movements, the qualifications of a secessionist movement and the definition of a successful 
secession must be clarified. This paper specifically focuses on national secessionist movements, 
which will be defined utilizing Roeder’s (2018) definition of a national secession campaign: 
“National secessionism is a political program claiming that a population residing 
inside another sovereign state constitutes a nation that has a right to its own 
sovereign state within the part of the common-state’s territory that the nation 
considers its homeland” 
 
The key aspect to this definition is the homeland consideration. A national secessionist campaign 
claims that the seceding population is not simply a collection of individuals seeking new 
governance, but a distinct nation with a self-identified homeland. This definition differentiates 
national secessionist movements from regional secessionist movements, such as movements 
seeking to establish an independent Republic of Texas. These regional secessionist movements, 
where the seceding territory does not constitute the national homeland of the campaign, will not 
be explored in this study. Additionally, while secessionist movements fall into the broader 
categories of statehood campaigns, which seek to build a state or receive autonomy, and 
peoplehood campaigns, which seek to construct a national or regional identity, national 
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secessionist movements will focus solely on the claim of an independent sovereign homeland 
state by a population residing within a larger sovereign state. 
 However, Roeder’s definition still needs some clarification. According to Stein (dis. 
2016), only four existing states constitute successful secessionist movements, as the creation of 
independent states through decolonization or through the dissolution of larger states, such as the 
former Soviet Union and Yugoslavia, do not qualify as secessionist campaigns. Stein’s reasoning 
for not including the USSR and Yugoslavia centers around the perceived lack of clarity between 
a “top-down” collapse of a governmental system through decisions by the central government or 
a “bottom-up” collapse due to actions by individual secessionist states. According to Coggins 
(2011), the creation of independent states through decolonization constitute national secessionist 
movements, such as the secession of Algeria from the French Empire. Roeder (2018) includes 
the creation of states through the dissolution of states as secessionist campaigns, but does not 
consider campaigns that support decolonization as a secessionist movement. For the purposes of 
this study, states that emerge from colonial empires will not be considered national secession 
campaigns, as the secessionist territory must be from a population residing within the metropole 
rather than from an external territory (Roeder 2018). As a result, to clarify the definition above, 
the “common-state’s territory” must be metropole and cannot include colonial territories. 
Colonial secession campaigns contribute many additional variables that do not apply to 
metropole national secessionist movements and maintain a different status from metropole 
territories, preventing an accurate determination of the relationship between diasporas and 
secessionist campaigns. However, in contrast to Stein, dissolution of states will be included in 
national secessionist campaigns, as long as the newly independent states are created within the 
established definition. This maintains Roeder’s definition of national secessionist movements, 
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where dissolution of states, such as the USSR and Yugoslavia, is included, but decolonization 
campaigns are not included in the definition. 
Success of a secession movement should be clarified as well. While the vast majority of 
the literature notes that the goal of a national secessionist movement is to create an independent 
state, the definition of the independent state is unclear. Many (Belanger et al. 2005; Coggins 
2011) consider an independent state to achieve success upon a threshold of international 
recognition. Roeder (2018) does not explicitly state the requirement for international recognition 
for success, but implies a necessity for international acceptance of a state through the campaigns 
that he declares successful. Other studies utilize the 1934 Montevideo Convention definitions of 
a state, which requires a permanent population, defined territory, independent government and 
capacity to enter into diplomatic relations with other states. Scott Pegg (1988) first discusses the 
definition of de facto states as having “an organized political leadership, which has risen to 
power through some degree of indigenous capacity; receives popular support; and has achieved 
sufficient capacity to provide governmental services to a given population in a specific territorial 
area, over which effective control is maintained for a significant period of time.” He then 
continues to state that such states seek “full constitutional independence and widespread 
international recognition.” Dov Lynch (2004) highlights this definition by denoting the 
differences between judicial and empirical notions of statehood. De facto states usually have not 
achieved the “capacity to enter into diplomatic relations” outlined in the Montevideo Convention 
and usually are seeking international recognition, which would prevent most de facto states from 
achieving judicial statehood. Achieving a recognized legitimate state through international 
judicial channels would require widespread international recognition, which Coggins (2011), 
Roeder (2018) and Belanger (2005) require for secessionist success. 
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 However, there is another measure for success of a secessionist movement, utilizing the 
empirical notion of statehood outlined by Lynch (2004). The empirical notion of statehood 
would define an independent state through the first three qualifications in the Montevideo 
Convention: an independent government, a permanent population and a defined territory. A 
successful state would have internal sovereignty, defined as supreme authority of the governing 
body over the population of a specified territory. While the de facto state would be lacking 
judicial independence and external sovereignty, the secessionist movement would be empirically 
successful, a necessary step to eventually achieving fully recognized independence. For the 
purposes of this study, I will define the success of a national secessionist movement as achieving 
an independent government with a defined territory and a permanent population. 
 To further discuss these three definitions, an independent government would mean an 
established political system with supreme authority over a defined territory, such as the Republic 
of China (Taiwan), which has an independent government with supreme authority over the island 
of Taiwan, despite being unrecognized by the majority of the international community. A 
successful independent government would have internal sovereignty, as defined above, and 
established by the de facto state. Additionally, a successful independent government is politically 
stable and should not struggle to maintain political legitimacy from the majority of the governed 
populace. While political legitimacy is difficult to measure and collect data on, it is worth 
mentioning, as historical instances where an independent government collapsed within a few 
years of independence should not be considered successful, such as the short-lived Crimean 
Republic in 1917. In sum, an independent government is successfully established when the 
governed population believes the territory is an independent state and when the government is 
politically stable and internally sovereign. 
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 Defined territory in the context of an empirically successful state is dependent on two 
factors: an agreed-upon definition of borders by the de facto government and an ability to 
maintain and protect those borders. A collective, governmental definition of the governed 
territory is necessary for a successful and stable state. The ability to protect those borders from 
the larger metropolitan state in case of invasion is necessary for stability as well. In the case of 
the Republic of Artsakh (Nagorno-Karabakh), the Artsakh Defense Army protects the borders of 
Nagorno-Karabakh from the Azerbaijani military with some military and arms assistance from 
Armenia, allowing the government of Artsakh to maintain its defined borders. The key 
difference between foreign military assistance and dependency is the ability to hold a standing 
army that can defend borders without a permanent foreign army. If the only army within Artsakh 
was the Armenian army or the Armenian army intended on maintaining a permanent force that 
the Artsakh army relied on for protection, then dependency would be reached and the 
secessionist movement would not be successful in creating an independent state. 
 Finally, a permanent population requires a little clarification. A successful state must 
have a permanent settled population over which to govern without significant, sustained outflow 
of migrants. If the governed population does not intend to remain in the established state, then 
the state will inherently fail. A successful state maintains a loyal population that supports the 
established political system and seeks to maintain independence from the larger metropolitan 
state. In sum, for this paper, a successful secessionist movement establishes an empirically-
independent state with an independent government, defined territory and a permanent 
population. 
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Previous Exploration of the Relationship between Diasporas and Secession: 
 The literature on the relationship between diaspora communities and successful 
secessionist movements is relatively scant. There are very few quantitative studies that measure 
this relationship with a wide array of results and the majority of qualitative discussions on this 
topic center around the same few cases: Palestine, Northern Ireland, Kosovo, Sri Lanka and 
Kurdistan. However, there seem to be three waves of literature that appeared regarding diasporas 
and their potential to affect secessionism in the homeland. 
 The first wave appeared in the early 1980s, when the role of diasporas began to transition 
from the classical definition of Armenians, Greeks and Jews to a broader, modern definition. 
Sheffer (1986) explicitly states that the study of modern diasporas is new and motivated by 
“observation that while these triadic relations [between diaspora, homeland and host country] are 
becoming an integral and permanent feature of current national and international politics, they 
have not been adequately studied.” The remainder of the collection of 1986 essays 
predominantly discuss the role of the homeland on the diaspora, coinciding with Cold War fears 
that states would utilize their diasporas for espionage or to affect change in other states. 
However, Horowitz (1986) discusses the ways that diasporas can incite or contribute to 
communal conflicts, through encouraging irredentist movements, such as the Turkish Cypriots 
attempting to rejoin Turkey, and through sending remittances and weapons to the homeland to 
encourage separatist conflict, such as the Irish diaspora monetarily supporting Northern Irish 
secession from the United Kingdom. Horowitz (1985) also directly states that “whether and 
when a secessionist movement will emerge is determined mainly by domestic politics… Whether 
the secessionist movement achieves its aims, however, is determined largely by international 
politics… occasionally, external relations reinforce separatist proclivities.” 
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Harik (1986) notes that Palestinian Arab support for Palestinian independence 
incentivized the duration and intensity of the conflict between Israel and Palestine, as 
secessionist organizations received remittances and external support that allowed for their 
continued existence in the face of military defeat. Esman (1986) notes that diasporas “may 
attempt to directly influence events in a home country” and discusses the Croatian diaspora in 
central Europe smuggling weapons into Yugoslavia to support Croatian independence and the 
Irish diaspora funding the Irish Revolutionary Army in Northern Ireland. While no quantitative 
studies were conducted, there was evidence that diasporas contributed to the intensity and 
duration of homeland conflicts and supported a number of secessionist movements. In addition, 
the three conflicts mentioned each had different outcomes, as the Northern Ireland secessionist 
movement was unsuccessful, the Croatian secessionist movement was successful and the 
Palestinian secessionist movement has not been resolved. As a result, the literature from this first 
wave demonstrates that diasporas contribute to the intensity and duration of secessionist 
movements and homeland conflicts, but does not claim that diasporas improve the likelihood of 
secessionist success. 
 The next wave of diaspora conflict literature emerged at the fall of the Soviet Union, 
where newly opened borders and new emerging states drove the exploration of ethnic conflict, 
secessionist movements and diasporas. The emergence of the Minorities at Risk dataset in the 
1990s drove a few quantitative studies investigating the relationship between secessionist 
success and diasporas. Gurr (1994) states that maintained social boundaries between diasporas 
and the hostland leads to increased loyalty to the homeland, potentially highlighting gaps for 
diaspora members to support conflict in the homeland. Saideman and Ayres (2000) measured 
“segments of ethnic kin in other states” as a significant variable for inciting secessionist 
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movements in the 1990s but not in the 1980s, which they find surprising; however, as this study 
is a comparison between causes of irredentism and secession, Saideman and Ayres merely state 
that this shows that irredentism and secession are not interchangeable and leave much of the 
interpretation of their results up to the reader. Sheffer (2003) notes that stateless diaspora leaders 
utilize more intense tactics to convince diaspora members that independence is important and 
instill a strong sense of identity and mobilization into their diaspora members. This long-distance 
nationalism (Anderson 1992) drives an intergenerational desire for the ultimate goal of an 
independent homeland, causing factions within diasporas, such as the Sikhs, Kurds and 
Palestinians, to stray towards supporting violent separatism. Sheffer (2003) also notes that a 
range of strategies can be employed by diasporas instead of supporting a secessionist strategy, 
ranging from full assimilation and integration into the host country to increased autonomy and 
separatism, and that strategies are chosen by individuals within the diaspora depending on the 
desired degree of cultural preservation. Sheffer (2003), Gurr (1994) and Saideman and Ayres 
(2000) each highlight that there are opportunities for diasporas to make an impact on ethnic 
conflicts and secessionist movements, with Saideman and Ayres even stating that co-ethnics 
living abroad are a significant factor in starting secessionist movements. 
 Additionally, the literature regarding diasporas as transnational social movements arises 
during this time period. Many (Baser and Swain 2010; Adamson 2012; Demmers 2002) note that 
diaspora activism strengthens secessionist movements and achieves the goal of getting increased 
international attention. Additionally, Demmers (2002) and Baser and Swain (2010) theorize that 
the physical removal from the realities of a conflict causes diasporas to encourage a strategy that 
encourages a refusal to negotiate, increasing the duration of secession movements with 
mobilized diasporas. Hockenos (2003) also notes similar psychological effects of Balkan 
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diaspora members contributing to secessionist movements in the homeland, as he notes that a 
feeling of “exile” produces regret and sharpened vision for political diaspora leaders. This 
sharpened vision is often radicalizing and encourages an intent to return to an improved 
homeland and a desire to expedite that return through encouraging political change through any 
means necessary. Safran (1991) also notes the “myth of return,” that he claims is inherent within 
a diaspora, is the center of political mobilization for the diaspora. 
Through this set of studies, a picture of a “diasporan mindset” emerges, as certain 
diaspora members become fixated on an idealized historical memory or myth regarding the 
homeland, driving their intent to return to some form of utopian homeland. This idealized 
viewpoint has the potential to be exacerbated by social media and ideological engagement, which 
furthers the logic of a connected ethnic community online. The maintenance of social boundaries 
outlined in the definition of diaspora has the potential to exaggerate this phenomenon, as the 
diasporan individual only interacts with co-ethnics and collectively maintains an intention to 
return to an ethnically-homogenous utopian homeland that likely never existed. This nationalist 
radicalizing phenomenon is demonstrated in Gourgen Yanikian’s 1973 assassination of two 
Turkish diplomats. Yanikian, an Armenian septuagenarian living in the United States since 1946 
without significant incident, assassinated two Turkish diplomats in California “in retaliation for 
the Armenian Genocide,” an event that had happened over fifty years prior. Yanikian’s 
interactions were primarily within the diaspora and his nationalist rhetoric stemmed from his 
own ideology of revenge for all Armenians. Tololyan (1987) states that Yanikian is understood 
through a “resonating roll-call that blurs history, context, and nuance," in reference to the support 
that Yanikian received from many members of the Armenian community. While the event has no 
clear significance to seeking secession, it is a primary example of how a “diasporan mindset” can 
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radicalize members of a diaspora. Once again, although the relationship between diaspora 
mobilization and secessionist success are not explicitly stated or studied, members of diasporas 
continue to affect secessionist movements through the ideological support of the “diasporan 
mindset.” 
 Finally, a modern wave of quantitative literature regarding ethnic state construction has 
emerged. Coggins (2011) argues that ethnic “distinctiveness” is not a significant cause for state 
birth, but does state that external support is the most significant factor for states achieving 
judicial statehood through independence campaigns. Saideman (2001; 2002) and Carment and 
James (1997) assert that shared ethnic ties are the central factor to third-state intervention in 
conflict, which, when coupled with Coggins (2011) would imply that diaspora populations are a 
central cause for successful statehood. In a similar vein, Arva and Piazza (2016) incorporate 
diasporas into the civil war and terrorism literature, stating that diasporas are significant in 
increasing use of terrorism in civil war conflicts. 
The key to this paper is that, while a number of studies have been conducted on the 
relationship between engaged diasporas and secessionist movements, each of them measures a 
different variable with regard to secessionist movements. The variation of this set of studies is 
best highlighted in Table 1A.  
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Table 1A: Previous Explorations of the Effect of the Diaspora on Secession 
Example Studies Dependent Variable Results 
Scheffer (1986, 
2003); Horowitz 
(1985); Saideman 
and Ayres (2002) 
Creation of Secessionist 
movements 
Mixed, only some studies state that 
diasporas incite secessionist movements 
or increase likelihood of secessionist 
strategies to achieve statehood goals 
Coggins (2011); 
Roeder (2018) 
International Recognition of 
states following secessionist 
campaigns 
No, the existence of diaspora 
communities do not increase the 
likelihood of international recognition 
of a secessionist state 
Harik (1986) Duration of secessionist conflict Yes, the existence of an engaged 
diaspora has increased the length of 
secessionist conflict 
Arva and Piazza 
(2015) 
Use of Terrorism Yes, an engaged diaspora increases 
likelihood of terrorism in civil conflict 
Esman (1986); 
Harik (1986) 
Intensity of secessionist conflict Yes, an engaged diaspora increases the 
likelihood of violence in resolving 
secessionist disputes 
Roeder (2018); 
Baser and Swain 
(2010) 
Media coverage of secessionist 
campaign 
Mixed, some studies argue that 
diasporas increase international media 
attention through protest and lobbying, 
while Roeder finds that “resourced 
diasporas” do not increase international 
media coverage 
 
As seen above, the literature has not formed a consensus on the role of diasporas in 
different aspects of secessionist movements. Some studies demonstrate clear impact of diasporas 
on secessionist movements but others claim that diasporas play no role at all in achieving 
statehood. While duration, intensity and use of terrorism have all been covered as a form of types 
of diasporan involvement, the end result of this protracted violence has only been explored with 
reference to international recognition. However, no studies have explored the relationship 
between an engaged diaspora and secessionist success as defined as a de facto or empirical state. 
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As a result, there is a major gap in the literature when success is defined as empirical 
independence rather than recognized independence, which this study intends to fill. 
Therefore, as the literature shows that diasporas have an effect on secessionist 
movements and the role of the “diasporan mindset” in emphasizing nationalist tendencies, the 
hypothesis for this paper becomes clear: 
 H1: An engaged diaspora increases the likelihood of a successful secessionist movement 
To clarify the causal mechanism of this study, the hypothesis stems from the following 
logic. Firstly, a diaspora develops in a host country. As previously stated, this begins in a variety 
of ways through forced or voluntary migration; however, each diaspora that develops actively 
maintains social boundaries between itself and the host society and remains connected to the 
homeland. Separately, a national secession movement arises that seeks to reclaim the ethnic 
homeland of the diaspora. While the diaspora may have played a part in the rise of the 
secessionist movement, that will not be the focus of this study, as a number of scholars in the 
literature have focused on the connection between diasporas and secessionist movement creation. 
A focus of this investigation will be the economic, political and ideological engagement that 
diaspora communities use to strengthen the secessionist movement in the homeland, leading to 
an increased likelihood of the success of the secessionist movement, as defined empirically. In 
sum, higher levels of diaspora engagement should lead to higher likelihood of secessionist 
campaign strength and success. 
To discuss the competing explanations for successful secessionist movements, there are 
four main competing explanations: the vulnerability approach, the tactical and logistical 
opportunities approach, the grievance approach, and the programmatic coordination approach. I 
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will give a brief outline of each approach here, as well as some counterpoints, and then delve 
into how I seek to control for each variable in the “data and methodology” section. 
The vulnerability approach follows the logic that when the metropolitan state is more 
vulnerable, the likelihood of a successful secessionist campaign increases. Political and 
economic instability increase the likelihood of secessionist campaigns arising and becoming 
successful, due to the weakness of the internal structure of the state. Belanger et al. (2005) 
introduce one of the critiques of the vulnerability approach, stating that the vulnerability 
approach fails to explain vulnerable state support for other secessionist movements. Other 
vulnerable states support secessionist movements, such as Italian support for Croatian 
independence from Yugoslavia, despite Italian economic instability and ongoing secessionist 
movements, such as South Tyrol. If secessionism is more successful when your state is 
vulnerable, then supporting another secessionist movement would seem foolish for a vulnerable 
state. However, as Heraclides (1990) and Belanger et al (2005) point out, multiethnic and 
vulnerable states are equally as likely as homogenous and stable states to support secessionist 
movements. This study seeks to control for state vulnerability, allowing investigation of the 
hypothesis that successful secessionist movements would be strengthened by engaged diasporas 
regardless of metropole political stability. 
 The tactical and logistical approach is a group of explanations that identify environmental 
and strategic conditions that give secessionist movements more success. These explanations 
include distance of seceding region from the capital, topographical advantages within the 
seceding region, economic resources within the seceding region and regime type of the 
metropolitan state (Fearon and Laitin 2003; Collier and Hoeffler 2001; Arva and Piazza 2016; 
Belanger et al 2005). For example, Belanger, Duschene and Paquin (2005) contest that ethnic 
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ties drive successful secessionist movements and promote similar “regime type” as a factor for 
external state support. While each of these reasons may increase the success of a campaign, it is 
unlikely that any one of them is the primary cause for a campaign’s success. Competing factors 
play larger roles than any of these variables, as a variable like topographical advantage does not 
have an altitude threshold that allows for a successful campaign. In sum, these explanations may 
contribute to explanations of success, but are unlikely to be a competing factor with diaspora 
support. As a result, I will investigate the more precise role of these competing factors in this 
study. 
 The grievance approach is an additional explanation that focuses on the incentive to 
begin secessionist movements, but is unlikely to contribute to the success of these campaigns. 
With regard to economic grievances, economic hardship and discrimination towards the seceding 
region is shown to increase terrorism and violence within the campaign (Piazza 2011; 2012). 
Fearon and Laitin (2003) additionally claim that poverty is a strong predictor for civil war 
conflict. However, Roeder (2018) finds that economic discrimination has no significance in his 
datasets and while economic grievance may drive anger and resentment against the majority 
population, it is not shown to increase secessionist success. Additionally, Anderson, von der 
Mehden and Young (1967, 71) criticize the usage of economics to explain secession, stating that 
“economic arguments may be used by separators to rationalize withdrawal but are rarely 
accepted as persuasive grounds for renouncing fragmentation by determined secessionist 
movements.” In general, economic grievances seem to be a symptom of successful secessionist 
campaigns rather than a cause; however, poverty and economic discrimination will need to be 
controlled in the case selection. Additionally, political grievances, such as political or cultural 
discrimination, have been shown to lead to the mobilization and development of secessionist 
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movements (Anderson 2004). Anderson (2004) argues political grievances in a federalist or 
democratic framework lead to strong mobilization around secessionist movements, which he 
believes will lead to success. While his main example is Quebec, which already has a significant 
amount of autonomy and has failed to pass a referendum regarding independence, political 
grievances will also need to be controlled by demonstrating political repression does not solely 
lead to successful secession. 
Roeder (2018) finds that resourced expatriates do not significantly increase the 
international media attention (significance) of a national secessionist campaign. Roeder utilizes a 
“Programmatic Coordination” explanation for secessionist success, stating that secessionist 
campaigns are most likely to be successful when each component of the campaign has the same 
coordinated end goals and maintains the same strategic goals throughout the campaign. As 
Roeder states, the programmatic coordination explanation is intended to be complementary to 
other competing explanations, not to replace them. Diaspora support of a campaign seems to be a 
potential cog in the campaign that Roeder writes off as a competing explanation. However, 
Roeder defines diaspora support as “resourced diasporas,” which measures wealth and influence 
of a diaspora in the host country, but does not necessarily measure engagement in the homeland. 
In addition, if diasporas support the same goals as the rest of the campaign and fund the 
campaign with military, ideological or economic support, then programmatic coordination could 
complement the diasporan explanation. In sum, there is no reason why diaspora leaders could not 
be considered a component of a national secession campaign, so long as they communicate and 
coordinate their goals with the campaign within the homeland. 
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Data and Methodology 
 This study follows a qualitative, case study approach to measuring the relationship 
between an engaged diaspora and homeland secessionist movements. 
 
Case Selection: 
In order to determine this relationship, I selected two case studies, Kosovo and Tatarstan, 
in order to measure internal validity, varying the key independent variable, the engagement of 
diasporas, across both cases, while attempting to hold competing independent variables constant. 
By varying the levels of diaspora engagement and holding competing variables constant, the 
spectrum of secessionist success will be fully dependent on levels of diaspora engagement. 
 However, finding cases without any additional variation in competing or complementary 
factors is nearly impossible in the real world and studies in the field of social science are unable 
to fully control away competing variables. Utilizing case studies can highlight relationships and 
causal mechanisms within these cases, but every case will have some exceptions to the rule 
(Howard 2017).  There is no absolute in measuring the limited set of case studies or dataset that 
can isolate a factor within the complex network of human interactions that contribute to 
secessionist campaigns. However, if similar cases with differing engaged diaspora levels exist, 
then a clear relationship between diaspora engagement and secessionist success can be easily 
determined. By attempting to isolate diasporan engagement, the eventual outcome of 
secessionism will more clearly demonstrate the relationship between engagement and success, 
even if the relationship does not exist at all (Howard 2017). However, any qualitative study, due 
to smaller sample size, is more susceptible to spuriousness and data outliers, as a sample size of 
two where one of the cases is an outlier could potentially lead to misleading results. Quantitative 
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studies can easily track outliers and misleading trends in ways that qualitative studies cannot, but 
quantitative studies also have a difficult time identifying causal mechanisms. However, through 
thoughtful case selection with existing datasets, I will ideally minimize potential spuriousness of 
results. 
 
Description of Variables: 
 In order to determine the success of secessionist campaigns, the operable definition of 
success must be measurable. While cases were not selected on the basis of secessionist success, a 
clear framework for how the dependent variable is measured is necessary for identifying the 
relationship between the independent and dependent variables. As previously stated, a successful 
secessionist movement establishes an empirically-independent state with an independent 
government, defined territory and a permanent population. In sum, if the established territory is 
able to create a de facto state, then the secessionist movement will be declared successful. To 
measure de facto states, I will utilize Florea’s “De Facto States in International Relations (1945-
2011)” dataset, as his criteria for selecting de facto states is similar to the above criterion. To 
specify, Florea highlights seven criteria for a de facto state:  
1. The territory belongs to or is administered by a recognized country, but is not a colonial 
possession. 
2. The territory seeks some degree of separation from the metropole and has declared inde- 
pendence (or has demonstrated aspirations for independence, for example, through a 
referendum or a “sovereignty declaration”) 
3. The governing state exerts military control over a territory inhabited by a permanent 
population 
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4. The governing state has not been sanctioned by the metropole government 
5. The governing state performs basic functions of governance, such as the provision of 
social or political order 
6. The state lacks international legal sovereignty (external sovereignty) 
7. The state exists for a minimum of two years 
The first two criteria are inherent to this study, as decolonization campaigns will not be 
measured and the focus of this paper centers around secessionist campaigns, so both cases have 
the potential to become a de facto state. The following criteria are similar to the aforementioned 
criteria of an independent government with a defined territory and a permanent population. The 
new addition to the previous criteria would be the two year minimum, which seems like an 
arbitrary yet reasonable timeframe to prove political stability. Florea’s dataset provides clarity to 
determining de facto states and supports the aforementioned definitions and criteria that I 
provide. However, the dataset is limited by timeframe and potential, as the dataset ends in 2011 
and he does not include any analysis regarding potential new de facto states, perhaps in an 
attempt to avoid speculation. These limitations should not hinder the selected case studies 
dramatically, as both of the case study secessionist movements begin prior to 2011. The time 
periods of each secessionist campaign case will be discussed later in the paper. 
 A key independent variable to control for in measuring secessionist success is diaspora 
size. Due to the nature of diasporas, this variable is more difficult to measure than standard 
immigrant populations, as active boundary maintenance and homeland orientation cannot be 
directly recorded, but must be recorded through approximate measures. Most countries record 
immigrant stocks as foreign residents or dual citizens; however, these measures do not 
successfully record the differences between immigrant communities and diasporas, as many of 
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these dual citizens or immigrants are attempting to assimilate into the host country society or do 
not actively orient themselves towards the homeland. Additionally, ethnic minorities are 
recorded by their nationality in a number of official databases, rather than by ethnicity, meaning 
that an ethnic Tatar from Russia could be recorded as Russian. Despite these difficulties in 
utilizing insufficient data, the size of the diaspora relative to the total ethnic population size in 
the homeland is key to determining that a significant diaspora actually exists outside of the 
homeland, as a diaspora will be unable to have a significant impact on a secessionist movement 
if the size of the diaspora is limited to a few individuals living outside the homeland. 
To determine diaspora size, I will be utilizing available migrant stocks in reporting 
countries as an inexact measure of the upper bound of diaspora size. Migrant stocks measure the 
total number of immigrants entering the country by country of origin. While this data by itself is 
highly inexact for measuring diaspora communities and usually gives little information regarding 
the ethnicity of the migrants, migrant stocks allow for a baseline estimate of minorities abroad. If 
recorded French migrant stocks report 10,000 migrants from Italy, but the Italian census reports 
that 16% of Italian nationals are ethnically Tyrolean German, a baseline assumption would be 
that approximately 1,600 Tyrolean Germans entered France. As a stand-alone data point, this 
extrapolation is fairly weak; however, this data will be coupled with available language data that 
reports the primary language spoken in each household. Many countries, including the United 
States, Canada, the United Kingdom and Russia, among others, record the primary language or 
“mother tongue” spoken by household within the country, giving estimates of the number of 
native speakers within each country. For example, the United States records a few hundred 
households that speak Catalan as a primary language, which gives an estimate of the lower 
bound of a diaspora. With migrant stocks recording an upper bound and language data recording 
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a lower bound, diaspora size can be roughly estimated in those countries that record these data. 
Additionally, a few countries record “self-reported” ethnicity, which allows the respondent to 
identify themselves as a specific ethnicity, providing additional insight to diaspora size. Self-
reported ethnicity is the most accurate measure for diaspora size, as ethnic minorities are allowed 
to identify with their ethnic background, preventing too much assumption on the part of the 
researcher; however, only a few countries record self-reported ethnicity, including Russia and 
Lithuania. Migrant stocks, primary language speakers and self-reported ethnicity will act as 
inexact proxies to measure approximate diaspora size. 
 The key independent variable in measuring secessionist success is diaspora engagement. 
Active participation in the homeland can be measured through a number of proxies, including 
remittances, existence of active lobbying organizations and anecdotal evidence, such as the 
existence of literature and social media accounts. Diaspora engagement remains the primary 
independent variable for measuring secessionist success and is measured through three channels: 
economic engagement, political engagement and ideological engagement. As a proxy for 
economic engagement, remittances measure the amount of income that a migrant community 
sends back to the homeland, allowing for insight into economic relationship between the 
diaspora and the homeland. Remittance data often does not show the exact location of the 
recipient, hindering knowledge of exact nominal support to the seceding homeland; however, 
when coupled with the data regarding diaspora size and host country captured above, a broader 
picture of diaspora support becomes clear. Remittance data is primarily captured on a country-to-
country level, such as dollar amount of income from the United States to Russia, which does not 
highlight specific regional remittances, such as the share of remittances sent to Tatarstan. 
However, based on size estimates of the diaspora, remittance data can be estimated as a share of 
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the total remittance amount sent to the homeland. These are clearly rough estimates and largely 
unavoidable; however, in certain cases, such as in Spain, remittance amounts are broken down to 
a state-by-state basis, which allows for more accurate measurements of remittances received by 
specific ethnic households. Once again, remittances are an imperfect measure for economic 
support of the diaspora to the homeland, but remittance data remains the most reliable proxy for 
diasporan economic engagement. 
As a proxy measurement of political engagement, active lobby organizations are reported 
in a number of countries. Most developed countries provide public lobby registries, some 
required by law and others reported voluntarily, but not every country provides lobbyist 
information, granting only some insight into political advocacy of a diaspora in the host country. 
If a lobby organization exists on behalf of a specific ethnic group or secessionist movement in 
any of the publically-available lobby registries, the group will highlight the political engagement 
of that diaspora in the homeland. By advocating for homeland or diaspora support in the 
hostland, the diaspora demonstrates political engagement and activism. To record the existence 
of diasporan public lobby organizations, keyword searches on official government lobby 
registers and specific bill tracking will successfully highlight existing diaspora lobby groups. The 
existence of diaspora-specific bills, such as a bill to recognize atrocities committed by Serbia 
against Kosovo, likely has the support of diaspora interest groups that would be recorded in a 
lobby registry. As a result, through keyword searches on lobby registries and bill tracking, 
existing diaspora organizations should sufficiently measure diaspora political engagement.1 
 
1 In a previous version of this paper, public demonstrations of support, such as protests, were included as 
a measure of political engagement. Diaspora communities often seek to gain international attention 
through public showings of solidarity with the secessionist community. This paper included “public 
demonstrations of support” as an additional measure of political engagement, utilizing the Mass 
Mobilization Data Project dataset. However, this dataset only included protests in the metropole. No other 
collective dataset was located to comprehensively determine anti-government protests around the world. 
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With regard to non-database evidence, ideological engagement remains difficult to 
objectively measure. Firstly, to look at a subsection of ideological engagement, the existence of 
pro-secessionist sentiments over social media is an important measure. As the two case studies 
began prior to the existence of social media, Twitter and Facebook were selected as two older 
forms of social media to measure the later end of the measured timeframes. Twitter data goes as 
far back as 2006, whereas Facebook data reaches back to 2004. No database exists for every post 
with pro-secessionist positions on social media and a full sentiment analysis is beyond the scope 
of this study. However, key searches on Twitter and Facebook will uncover the existence of pro-
secession pages and groups, where collective sentiments may occur. Search terms for Twitter 
will follow this format: 
Kosovo (diaspora OR secession OR free OR leave OR independence OR 
independent OR finally OR albanian) until:2009-01-01 since:2006-01-01 
Search terms for Facebook are confined to single-word search terms: “Kosovo,” 
“Shqipni,” and “Kosova.” While measuring groups with pro-secessionist ideas on Twitter and 
Facebook is an inexact proxy for the sentiments of a full diaspora, the existence of pro-
secessionist or diasporan nationalist pages will add to the ideological narrative. These pages are 
public, which additionally limits the scope of accuracy for determining ideological support 
within the diaspora in private profiles or groups; however, the existence of any pro-secessionist 
groups or pages with a minimum membership of fifty individuals will be considered a sufficient 
data point for ideological engagement. 
Additionally, other proxies for ideological engagement include diaspora-written pro-
secessionist books and academic articles. These variables will simply be measured on a yes/no 
basis, as the existence of a pro-secessionist article in a peer-reviewed journal or a pro-
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secessionist published book is a sufficient data point for ideological support. Through keyword 
searches on WorldCat and Dow Jones Factiva, two separate databases of books and media 
articles, I will be able to identify and collect data regarding pro-secessionist journal articles and 
other literature. However, due to the high volume of articles over the measured timeframe, 
analyzing randomly selected years within the timeframe may need to be implemented in order to 
control the scope of this measure. The combination of a diaspora-driven social media presence 
and an academic and literary ideological basis for secession among the diaspora community 
should act as a sufficient proxy for measuring ideological engagement. 
Finally, a catch-all variable is needed for other direct diaspora engagement, such as arms 
support and joining secessionist forces. These forms of engagement fall into dual categories, 
such as economic and ideological support for sending weapons to the secessionist campaign. 
These two measures of engagement are difficult to measure, as armament totals or secessionist 
army strength are rarely reported and usually roughly estimated. In order to measure arms 
support and diaspora military support to the homeland secessionist movement, this paper will 
rely on news sources collected through key searches on Factiva. Similar to the above measures, 
measurement for this variable relies on media reporting in order to determine if any examples of 
arms donations or military support occurred within the diaspora. While a significantly inexact 
proxy, these media articles will provide some insight into the relationship between the diaspora 
and the homeland secessionist movement. 
Once again, similar to measuring diaspora size, each of these measures are inexact, as 
there is not yet any database that records diaspora literature data. A description of the data used 
to measure diaspora size and engagement is summarized in Table 2A. 
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Table 2A: Diaspora Size and Engagement 
Variable Measured Measurement Data Source 
IV1A: Diaspora Size Migrant Stocks UN Data: “Foreign 
Population (non-citizens) by 
country of citizenship, age 
and sex” 
IV1A: Diaspora Size Primary Language Data Country-dependent census 
data (United States, Canada, 
UK, Russia, European Union) 
IV1A: Diaspora Size Self-reported Ethnicity Country-dependent census 
data (Russia) 
IVIB: Diaspora Economic 
Engagement 
Remittances World Bank: “Bilateral 
Remittance Matrix” 
IVIB: Diaspora Political 
Engagement 
Lobby Organizations Public lobby registers 
IVIB: Diaspora Ideological 
Engagement 
Pro-Secessionist Social Media 
Groups 
Keyword searches on Twitter 
and Facebook 
IVIB: Diaspora Ideological 
Engagement 
Pro-Secessionist Literature 
and Academia 
Worldcat, Factiva 
IVIB: Diaspora Engagement 
(Catchall) 
Arms Sales and Military 
Recruits from Diaspora 
Factiva 
 
 With regard to the quality of data, official country censuses form the basis for the World 
Bank and UN Data databases, as well as for the measurements of primary language and self-
reported ethnicity. While official country-wide censuses are not perfect due to inherent margins 
of error and potential politically-motivated underreporting, the census is the best and most 
accessible metric for measuring data on diasporas. Notably, only certain countries measure 
primary language, which each country measures differently, ranging from “mother tongue/first 
language” to “additional languages spoken” to “language spoken at home.” Each of these 
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measures contribute to estimating a diaspora size, with the obvious caveat that diaspora size can 
only be estimated through proxy measures and cannot be exactly calculated by any current 
means. 
With regard to measures of diaspora engagement, lobby organizations are self-reported 
by certain countries with transparency laws, including the United States, the European Union, 
France and the United Kingdom. Germany only has a voluntary public lobbying register, so not 
every German lobby group will be accessible; however, the German state of Saxony-Anhalt does 
have a required public lobbying register, which will partially contribute to determining diaspora 
engagement in Germany. Measuring public self-reported lobby registers has a few setbacks. 
Firstly, the list is clearly not exhaustive, as only a few countries have publicly accessible lobby 
registers, limiting the data to only a few, mostly European countries. Secondly, the data is self-
reported meaning that governments may attempt to manipulate the lobbying data by hiding 
certain registered organizations. Thirdly, lobby organizations often do not report their clients, 
allowing for lobby groups to offer anonymity to potential governments or external actors. 
However, despite these shortcomings, the existence of lobbying organizations with specific 
diasporan initiatives will serve as a measure for diaspora engagement. To clarify, evidence of 
engagement would include the Albanian American Civil League lobbying the U.S. House of 
Representatives to pass a bill declaring support for Kosovo independence in 2007. While this is 
not an exact nominal measure, it provides evidence to diaspora engagement in the host country. 
Anecdotal evidence, such as the existence of a pro-secessionist literature or pro-secessionist 
social media campaigns or posts, will be included as supplemental evidence to diaspora 
engagement as measured by remittances and lobbying organizations. In sum, engagement will be 
partially nominal, based on the amount of remittances sent to the homeland and number of 
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measured pro-secessionist protests, and partially qualitative and anecdotal, based on the evidence 
of lobbying campaigns, pro-secessionist literature and social media campaigns. 
In addition to the key independent variable, I seek to control for a number of competing 
approaches. The first competing approach is the vulnerability approach, which states that 
secessionist success is most likely when the metropole regime is unstable. In order to control for 
this approach, the theoretical relationship must be outlined: 
H2: Secessionist success is more likely when the metropole is more fragile 
The logic is that political and economic instability increase the vulnerability of a state to 
a secessionist movement, which leads to secessionist success, as the vulnerable metropole cannot 
effectively organize itself or collect the necessary resources to maintain control over the seceding 
territory. To measure state vulnerability, I will be utilizing the Center for Systemic Peace’s State 
Fragility Index, which determines the fragility of 167 countries on the basis of legitimacy and 
stability in each state’s security, economy, government and society. The State Fragility Index 
assigns a clear numerical value to each state from 1995 to 2018, allowing for an ability to control 
for state vulnerability based on average metropole fragility during each secessionist movement. 
While the dataset allows for a clear, nominal measure of regime vulnerability, the State Fragility 
Index is not without faults. Many of the measures of state fragility are generalized in the index; 
for example, external military aid and foreign military intervention are considered to be 
independent measures of fragility. While external military aid may be a sign of state fragility, it 
may also be a sign of intercountry cooperation or technological advancement. These generalities 
in the measurement of state fragility can lead to a mischaracterization of true state vulnerability. 
However, with an awareness of these limitations, the State Fragility Index will continue to shed 
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clear insight into regime stability for this project. Table 2B highlights the variables and data 
utilized to control for the vulnerability approach. 
 
Table 2B: Metropole Vulnerability to Secessionist Movements 
Variable Measured Measurement Data Source 
IV2: Metropole Vulnerability State Fragility INSCR: “State Fragility 
Index” 
 
 The next competing independent variables are tactical and logistical approaches, as 
outlined previously. There are a number of competing theories within this variable, but each of 
them is fairly easy to measure and hold constant when selecting cases. The first group of these 
variables are tactical economic opportunities for secession, which some (incl. Lujala, Rod and 
Thieme 2007 and Collier and Hoeffler 2006) argue lead to higher likelihood of secessionist 
success. To measure the tactical economic advantages that some states may have, this study 
follows Roeder’s logic (2018) and controls for petroleum in the homeland and diamonds in the 
homeland. Both of these measurements will allow tactical economic advantages in the homeland 
to be held constant. The theoretical relationship for this competing argument is as follows: 
 H3: Secessionist success is more likely when the seceding homeland has a tactical 
economic advantage over the metropole. 
 Additionally, geographic advantages must be held constant. Some (Buhaug 2006) argue 
that further distance between the secessionist homeland and the central metropolitan government 
leads to higher likelihood of secessionist success. To utilize Buhaug’s logic, “Since residents of 
peripheral areas are more distant from the capital, where the public goods presumably are 
produced, they receive fewer benefits for their taxes and therefore have an incentive to secede” 
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(2006, 697.) Others (incl. Tollefsen, Forø, Strand and Buhaug 2012) argue that a secessionist 
movement is more likely to achieve success when the seceding homeland touches an 
international border. Finally, due to the nature of guerilla warfare, some (Lacina 2006) argue that 
secessionist campaigns are more successful in mountainous terrain. The theoretical relationship 
is recorded below: 
H4: Secessionist success is more likely when the seceding homeland has a tactical 
geographic advantage over the metropole. 
 The data and variables for this section are recorded in Table 2C. 
 
Table 2C: Tactical Economic and Geographic Advantages 
Variable Measured Measurement Data Source 
IV3A: Tactical Economic 
Advantage 
Petroleum in Homeland PRIO: “Petroleum Dataset 
v1.2” 
IV3A: Tactical Economic 
Advantage 
Diamonds in Homeland PRIO: “Diamond Curse 
Replication Data” 
IV3B: Tactical Geographic 
Advantage 
Distance between Capitals PRIO-GRID: “Distance to 
Capital” 
IV3B: Tactical Geographic 
Advantage 
Distance to International 
Border 
PRIO-GRID: “Distance to 
Own Borders” 
IV3B: Tactical Geographic 
Advantage 
Mountainous terrain PRIO-GRID: “Area covered 
by mountains (proportion), 
average” 
 
 To discuss the quality of the data, this study measures tactical and logistical advantages 
using the “PRIO-GRID” datasets, constructed by the Peace Research Institute Oslo. Following 
standard spatial disaggregation techniques, PRIO-GRID measures each of these variables 
through a spatio-temporal grid structure, utilizing quadratic grid cells to cover a world map. In 
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plain English, PRIO-GRID maps a number of variables, including armed conflicts, socio-
economic conditions, ethnic groups, and physical attributes over time, displaying a spectrum of 
these variables across a world map as a grid. Each cell covers a longitude and latitude point, 
allowing for sufficient determination of specific locations on the grid. While PRIO-GRID is a 
well-tested and useful dataset, the limitations of the dataset, like most data collection, are mostly 
time-based. The grid was last updated in 2015, which is mostly sufficient for the data utilized in 
this paper, as mountains, oil reserves and distances between capitals rarely change. However, a 
temporal delay is worth noting for use in this dataset. In addition, exact distances or altitudes are 
not measured, but kept on a spectrum of near to far, measured by different distance thresholds. 
For example, the distance between Kosovo’s capital of Pristina and Serbia's capital of Belgrade 
is on the brink of “somewhat far” and “far” because it is within about ten kilometers of the cutoff 
point. This threshold approach allows for simplification of data, but does lead to some 
distinctions that may be misleading, as Pristina is closer to Belgrade than Kazan is to Moscow, 
but are included within the same threshold grouping. While this limitation is necessary to be 
aware of, it will not hinder results dramatically. 
 The next competing independent variable is external state support. As discussed 
previously, Coggins (2011) finds that external support from other established countries is the 
best determinant of secessionist success. To measure the effect of external state support on 
secessionist success, judicial support and physical support must be taken into effect. Judicial 
support is measured through official recognition. Physical support, such as economic or military 
support, from a foreign state or state-led actor is recorded in the Center for International 
Development and Conflict Management’s Minorities at Risk dataset. The inherent problem of 
recording external support for secessionist movements is that the majority of support is covert or 
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unofficial; however, the MAR dataset provides the best collected data regarding foreign country 
support from 1990-2009 (Saideman 2002). As a result, for the purposes of this study, external 
support will be determined using the MAR dataset for the measured time frame. To restate the 
theoretical relationship between external state support and successful secession: 
 H5: Secessionist success is more likely when the seceding homeland receives external 
support from another state. 
 Once again, the data for this section is recorded in Table 2D. 
 
Table 2D: External Support for Secessionist Movement 
Variable Measured Measurement Data Source 
IV4A: External Judicial 
Support 
Official Recognition Recognition by one or more 
United Nations members 
IV4B: External Physical 
Support 
Economic Support Minorities at Risk dataset 
IV4B: External Physical 
Support 
Military Support Minorities at Risk dataset 
 
 To discuss the data utilized in this section, the Minorities at Risk database captures a 
record of foreign economic or military support to secessionist campaigns, which this paper will 
utilize to measure independent variable 4B. Foreign support of a secessionist movement is often 
kept classified and is largely reported by the media, which MAR uses on to create the database of 
external support. Relying on a combination of including journalistic accounts, government 
reports, group organizations, and scholarly materials, the MAR database constructs a chronology 
of events for the secessionist movement. While this dataset relies on only publicly available 
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information, the MAR database will provide sufficient measurement of external state support for 
secessionist campaigns. 
 The next set of competing variables deal with the grievances approach outlined above. 
The basic outline for the grievances argument is that secessionist movements are more likely to 
be successful when the seceding population feels mistreated or the subjects of unfair policies. 
This includes economic grievances, which will be measured by the regional per capita GDP level 
in the seceding territory as compared to the rest of the country. Fearon and Laitin (2001) find that 
after controlling for per capita income, regions are no more likely to experience civil war or 
secessionism, arguing that higher poverty rates and lower relative income per capita lead to more 
successful means of recruitment for insurgency and secession. To measure per capita income, I 
will be utilizing OECD statistics for reporting countries, which are based on reporting country 
census reports. The strengths and limitations of census information have been discussed under 
the primary independent variable section. To control for this economic grievance theory, the 
theoretical relationship is as follows: 
 H6: Secessionist success is more likely when the seceding population has lower per 
capita income than the per capita income in the metropole. 
 Economic grievances are not the only form of populations feeling mistreated. Anderson 
(2004) argues that political grievances, such as repression of civil liberties, lead to higher 
mobilization of the seceding population, which in turn leads to a higher likelihood of secessionist 
success. To measure political grievance, I will utilize Freedom House’s database to compare the 
civil liberties in each of the case countries at the time of secession. Freedom House allows for a 
largely objective and unique numerical ranking for regimes on the basis of political rights and 
civil liberties. Freedom House focuses largely on the practice of these freedoms rather than the 
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existence of laws to avoid deception from regimes that act outside of their own Constitutional 
structure. Similar to the limitations of PRIO-GRID, Freedom House utilizes a spectrum of 
thresholds from one to five where the distinction between a high three and a low four may be 
very little in practice, but is distinctly different with regard to their rankings. Once again, this 
limitation must be noted and the numerical score for each country cannot be taken as objective 
fact, but the limitation should not hinder results. 
Additionally, cultural grievances, such as a majority usage of a different language in the 
homeland, must be taken into account. According to Gellner (1983), differing religion or spoken 
language in the seceding region from the majority language or religion in the metropole lead to a 
feeling of misrepresentation, and cultural grievances develop within the differing population. To 
determine different languages spoken in the secessionist regions, this paper utilizes Roeder’s 
Ethno-linguistic Fractionalization (ELF) dataset, which records the likelihood that two 
individuals speak different languages or are different ethnicities in each country profile entry. To 
determine the different religions practiced by a majority of the seceding ethnic population, this 
paper utilizes CIDCM’s A-Religion dataset, which measures ethnic minority group religions. As 
long as the majority of a specific ethnicity speaks a different language or practices a different 
religion from the majority of the metropole’s populace, the secessionist movement will be 
counted as having cultural grievances with the metropole. In some cases, the majority of the 
population speaks the de facto metropole language in addition to a separate language, such as 
Tatars in Russia speaking both Tatar and Russian in order to communicate with the majority of 
the state. In cases such as this, the differing language will still be considered a cultural grievance, 
as a Tatar-Russian combination of languages is still different from an ethnic Russian speaking 
Russian outside of Tatarstan. The theoretical relationship for this variable is as follows: 
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 H7: Secessionist success is more likely when the seceding population has political or 
cultural grievances. 
 Once again, Table 2E highlights the variables and data utilized to control for the 
grievance approach. 
 
Table 2E: Economic, Political and Cultural Grievances of Seceding Populations 
Variable Measured Measurement Data Source 
IV5A: Economic Grievance Relative GDP per capita OECD Stats: “Regional 
Economy”  
IV5B: Political Grievance Civil Liberties within 
metropole at time of secession 
Freedom House: “Civil 
Liberties” 
IV5C: Cultural Grievance Different homeland religion 
from majority religion 
A-Religion START dataset 
IV5C: Cultural Grievance Different homeland language 
from majority language 
Ethno-Linguistic 
Fractionalization (ELF) 
dataset 
 
 Finally, the last competing set of variables fall under Roeder’s Programmatic 
Coordination (2018) approach. Within the framework of Roeder’s theory that the most 
successful secessionist campaigns coordinate all major actors within the campaign, Roeder 
highlights two necessary measures: programmatic authenticity and programmatic realism. 
Programmatic authenticity is a measure of external legitimacy, where an authentic campaign 
must be “believed in” by the seceding population. Following Roeder’s model, I measure 
authenticity through the campaign’s ability to establish an internally agreed-upon distinct 
territory for secession, the campaign’s center around a “conventionally recognized ethnicity” 
(Roeder 2018, 105) and the lack of a non-contiguous, alternative homeland. Basically, in 
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Roeder’s view, a campaign is authentic when the population has a pre-established identity, a 
clear homeland and no other options for an independent state anywhere else. A secessionist 
campaign must also be realistic. Programmatic realism measures the population’s belief that the 
campaign will eventually be successful. If the seceding population believes that the campaign 
will not succeed, then, following Roeder’s logic, the campaign is unlikely to succeed. Measures 
of realism include population size within the homeland to be similar to other existing state sizes 
and the existence of a prior ethnic state, which can rely on ancient historical states, such as 
Basque rhetorical use of the Kingdom of Navarre as an ethnic precedent, or a previous modern 
state, such as Ukraine following the fall of the Soviet Union. Utilizing these measures, Roeder 
establishes our final competing theoretical relationship: 
 H8: Secessionist success is more likely when the secessionist campaign has established 
programmatic authenticity and programmatic realism. 
 To clarify, Roeder (2018) separates diasporas from the secessionist movement, measuring 
a resourced diaspora as a separate competing explanation to his approach. However, as 
previously stated, programmatic authenticity relies heavily on established views of the homeland 
and ethnic identity, which the diaspora often supports and provides. Additionally, the diaspora is 
potentially a facet of a secessionist campaign, as secessionist campaigns have historically created 
an independent government-in-exile that can be considered part of the diaspora, such as in 
Western Sahara, where the Polisario Front governs from Algeria. In sum, while Roeder’s 
approach is a competing argument, neither argument is fully exclusive of the other. Table 2F 
highlights the variables measured and data utilized for this section. 
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Table 2F: Programmatic Authenticity and Programmatic Realism of Secession Campaigns 
Variable Measured Measurement Data Source 
IV6A: Programmatic 
Authenticity 
Distinct Territory Roeder’s Data: “National 
Secessionism” 
IV6A: Programmatic 
Authenticity 
Conventionally Recognized 
Ethnicity 
All Minorities at Risk 
IV6A: Programmatic 
Authenticity 
Alternative Homeland Roeder’s Data: “National 
Secessionism” 
IV6B: Programmatic Realism Population Size Relative to 
Other Recognized States 
Country census 
IV6B: Programmatic Realism Prior Statehood Roeder’s Data: “National 
Secessionism” 
 
 To discuss the data utilized for IV6, to identify “conventionally recognized ethnicities” 
that Roeder highlights, I will be utilizing the All Minorities at Risk (AMAR) dataset, a 
comprehensive dataset of each ethnicity within each state. While limited by the scope of the 
project, as AMAR only includes ethnic populations of 100,000 or one percent of a country’s total 
population, the majority of secessionist movements require a larger population that 100,000 
individuals. As a result, despite the limitations of scope, AMAR will provide a framework for 
identifying if a “conventionally recognized ethnicity” is the centerpiece of the secessionist 
movement. Additionally, Roeder’s datasets provide information regarding distinct territory, 
alternative homeland and prior statehood. 
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Description of Cases: 
 As described above, the key variable in this study is the diaspora, specifically measured 
through size and engagement. When selecting cases, I sought to control for as many competing 
variables as possible; however, as previously stated, not every variable can be held constant 
across all cases. I selected two cases on the basis of diaspora size and engagement, ranging from 
a large diaspora with high engagement to a large diaspora with intermediate engagement.2 For 
this study, a large diaspora means any ethnic group where more than twenty percent of the total 
ethnic population resides outside of the homeland. 
 For the large diaspora with high engagement, the first case study is the Kosovo 
secessionist project from Serbia, ranging from 1991 to 2008. Kosovar Albanians formed a 
number of diaspora communities across Europe and North America following the dissolution of 
Yugoslavia in 1991 and the subsequent Kosovo War in 1998-1999. For this paper, the 
engagement of these communities towards the Kosovo secessionist movement will be measured 
from the dissolution of Yugoslavia in 1991 until the Kosovo declaration of independence in 
2008. Data and records regarding Kosovo pre- and post-independence from Serbia are extensive 
and information on Kosovo should be fairly complete for the purposes of this project. In order to 
limit additional variations, the observed time frame for each secessionist movement will be as 
similar as possible, with emphasis on major events to create the upper and lower limits for the 
measured length of each campaign. For the Kosovo campaign, the 17-year timeframe from 1991 
to 2008 will provide those upper and lower limits. 
 
2 Initially, this project had three large diaspora cases, varying from high engagement to low engagement, with South 
Tyrol being the third “low engagement” case. However, due to the lack of data on the South Tyrolean diaspora, 
unclear beginning and end dates for the campaign, and the continued persistence of South Tyrol as an irredentist 
state, this case was not included. Excluding colonies, no other diaspora communities larger than 10% of the total 
global ethnic population size had low engagement profiles. As a result, the comparison will vary between 
secessionist campaigns with highly engaged large diasporas (Kosovo) and secessionist campaigns with moderately 
engaged large diasporas (Tatarstan). 
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 For the large diaspora with intermediate engagement, the second case study is the 
Republic of Tatarstan secessionist campaign from Russia. Following the dissolution of the Soviet 
Union in late 1991, Tatars scattered around Europe and Central Asia, establishing a sizable 
diaspora community. Despite a number of declarations of independence, the secessionist 
campaign ended in 2007 following a power-sharing agreement between Russia and Tatarstan that 
limited Tatarstan’s autonomy, effectively ending any hope of independence. Like Kosovo, data 
on transnational Tatar communities and Tatarstan statistics is fairly complete, preventing any 
significant gaps in measuring the relationship between Tatars and the homeland. For the 
Tatarstan campaign, the 16-year timeframe from 1991 to 2007 will provide the beginning and 
end of the secessionist movement. 
 Lastly, to discuss some important measures, the time period for each secessionist 
campaign must be specified. In order to more accurately compare different secessionist 
campaigns, the length of time considered for each movement must be similar. To best compare 
each of the measured nominal variables below, such as relative GDP per capita, which changes 
annually, each nominal measure will be averaged over the length of the campaign. To determine 
the length of each campaign, specific important events will be chosen as the beginning and end 
points of each movement, such as outbreaks of violence or referendum votes, to attempt to 
compare campaigns that vary in length. For example, despite other attempts to establish an 
independent Kosovo throughout history, the Kosovo independence movement will refer 
specifically to movement spanning from the dissolution of Yugoslavia in 1991 to 2008, when 
Kosovo passed a declaration of independence. 
 To discuss the attempted controls across these secessionist campaigns, Table 2G 
highlights the data points for each campaign. 
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Table 2G: Variation in Competing Variables between Kosovo and Tatarstan Secessionist 
Campaigns 
Variable Measurement Kosovo Campaign (1991-
2008) 
Tatarstan Campaign (1990-
2007) 
IV2: Metropole Vulnerability Serbian average vulnerability 
from 1995-2008: 8.93/25 
Russian average vulnerability 
from 1995-2007: 9.69/25 
IV3A: Petroleum in Homeland None Yes 
IV3A: Diamonds in Homeland None None 
IV3B: Distance between 
Capitals 
275.39-1480.43km (blue) 275.39-1480.43km (blue) 
IV3B: Distance to 
International Border 
Adjacent (Albania, 
Macedonia, Montenegro) 
Non-adjacent 
IV3B: Mountainous Terrain Very Mountainous (0.8-1% 
mountainous terrain) 
Few Mountains (0-0.2%) 
IV4A: Current Recognition of 
independence by UN 
Members 
110 members 0 members 
IV4B: External economic 
support 
United States None 
IV4B: External physical 
support 
NATO intervention None 
IV5A: Relative GDP per 
Capita (2010 US$) 
$2,004.63 average 
GDP/capita from 2000-2008 
($1,536.62 less than Serbian 
average)  
$12,325 GDP/capita in 2004 
($2,403 more than Russian 
GDP/capita in 2004) 
IV5B: Civil Liberties of 
Metropole 
Average Civil Liberties from 
1991-2008: 4.18/7 
Average Civil Liberties from 
1990-2007: 4.44/7 
IV5C: Different Homeland 
Religion 
Yes (Sunni Islam) Yes (Sunni Islam) 
IV5C: Different Homeland 
Language 
Yes (Albanian) Yes (Tatar) 
IV6A: Distinct Territory Yes (Kosovo) Yes (Republic of Tatarstan) 
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IV6A: Conventionally 
Recognized Ethnicity 
Yes (Kosovo Albanians) Yes (Tatars) 
IV6A: Non-Contiguous 
Alternative Homeland 
None None 
IV6B: Population Size and 
Similar Country Comparison 
1,739,825 residents of 
Kosovo in 2011 (similar in 
size to Bahrain) 
3,786,488 residents of 
Tatarstan in 2010 (similar in 
size to Eritrea or Georgia) 
IV6B: Prior Statehood None, only autonomous 
designation 
None, only autonomous 
republic designation 
 
 As previously stated, not every variable was sufficiently held constant. Average 
metropole vulnerability throughout the length of the secessionist campaign largely remained the 
same between the two campaigns. However, a number of tactical variables, such as petroleum in 
the homeland, mountainous terrain and distance to an international border are different between 
Kosovo and Tatarstan. Average GDP per capita is also different, with Tatarstan exhibiting 
relative wealth to Russia and Kosovo exhibiting relative poverty to Serbia. External support and 
recognition will be further measured in the Kosovo and Tatarstan sections; however, based solely 
on UN-member recognition, Kosovo has high recognition, while Tatarstan does not. Most of the 
IV5 measures are shared between Kosovo and Tatarstan, with the exception of average GDP per 
capita, meaning that political and cultural grievances will remain the same for both Kosovar 
Albanians and Tatars in the homeland during this timeframe. While not every variable remains 
constant between the two countries, the two cases were selected to demonstrate the spectrum of 
diaspora engagement in secessionist movements, while holding as many competing variables 
constant as possible. 
 In the remaining parts of this paper, I will describe whether the empirical evidence 
supports or does not support my central hypothesis and alternative arguments, specifically those 
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my case selection is not able to control for. The first section measures the Kosovo Albanian 
diaspora’s engagement towards the 1991-2008 Kosovo secessionist movement, followed by the 
Tatar diaspora’s engagement towards the 1991-2007 Tatarstan secessionist movement. An 
analysis section will provide more in-depth analysis of the empirical findings, comparing the two 
campaigns and discussing the significance of the results. The paper will conclude with a 
summary of major points and recommendations for future diaspora studies analysis. 
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Kosovo 
Size Estimates of the Kosovar Albanian Diaspora: 
 The modern Kosovar Albanian diaspora in Europe and the United States was formed in 
waves of migrations from Yugoslavia (Phillips 2012, 32). The first waves of Kosovar Albanians 
to the United States and Europe began in the 1920s following economic hardships and 
oppression under Serbianization policies (Williams 2001). Subsequent post-war waves followed 
the rise of Communism in Yugoslavia in 1944 and Tito’s liberal work abroad policies for 
citizens of Socialist Yugoslavia in 1970 (Dimova 2013, 27). The final major waves occurred 
during the independence campaign, following the fall of Communism in 1991 and during the 
Kosovo war in 1998-1999 (Phillips 2012). These waves are important for understanding the 
formation of the diaspora, as each wave of Kosovar Albanians fled or left for different reasons, 
but remained united by language and culture when they arrived in Albanian communities in the 
host country. This repeated influx of Kosovar Albanians consistently connected older Albanian 
communities with the homeland and created an inter-generational network of active diaspora 
members. 
 The size of the Kosovar Albanian diaspora is difficult to disaggregate from the total 
Albanian diaspora, as Albanians from Macedonia, Albania and former Yugoslavia also migrated 
to Albanian communities around the world. However, there are a number of Kosovar Albanian 
diaspora size estimates to demonstrate a ballpark number. The Kosovo government in 2011 
published a migrant stock count that measured Kosovar Albanians departing from Kosovo from 
1969-2011. According to the official source, approximately 355,826 Kosovar Albanians lived 
abroad in 2008; however, this estimate does not include second or third generation Kosovar 
Albanians in the diaspora, forming a lower-bound estimate. 
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 Diaspora size can also be estimated using immigrant stocks, which are recorded in most 
country censuses. Utilizing reported host country estimates and excluding other “homeland 
countries,” such as Serbia, Albania and Macedonia, most immigrant stocks calculate 
approximately 278,727 Kosovar Albanians in the diaspora around 2003.3 This calculation is also 
a lower-bound size estimate, as immigrant stocks have similar shortcomings to emigrant stocks 
calculated by the Kosovo government. 
 The final size estimates are based on media reports, which likely overestimate the 
diaspora size by failing to successfully distinguish between the Albanian diaspora and the 
Kosovar diaspora. According to a 1999 Wall Street Journal article, there is “a diaspora of more 
than 600,000 Kosovars living elsewhere in Europe and 300,000 in North America.” In 1998, the 
Toronto Star estimated “the 600,000-strong Kosovar diaspora - mostly in Germany and 
Switzerland - is wedded to its roots,” while a different 2005 Toronto Star article estimates a 
“200,000 Kosovar diaspora (mostly in Germany and Switzerland, and about 30,000 in the United 
States).” The 600,000 Kosovar estimate is repeated in a number of media reports, ranging from 
1997-1999, offering an upper-bound size estimate for the diaspora during the midpoint of the 
independence campaign. As a result, despite the Wall Street Journal estimating 900,000 
Kosovars in Europe and North America in 1999, I believe the estimated size of the diaspora 
ranges from 278,727 Kosovars to 600,000, which means that the diaspora constitutes between 
15-32% of the entire Kosovo world population. 
 The Kosovo diaspora is clearly large. I will demonstrate below that the engagement of 
the diaspora in the homeland is the significant factor in measuring the diaspora’s effect on 
secession. The following section maps out Kosovar diaspora engagement from 1991 to 2008, 
 
3 The year is around 2003 as not every country's census falls on the same year. As a result, 2003 is an 
average year for the range of census years of available countries, which stretched from 2001-2010. 
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utilizing aforementioned measures of economic, political, ideological and military support to the 
homeland from the diaspora. 
 
Kosovo Process Tracing: 
The Kosovar Albanian diaspora has been an institution of Kosovo since the Ottoman 
Empire, following the establishment of the League of Prizren in 1878. Known as the Central 
Committee for Defense of the Rights of the Albanian Nation, the League of Prizren consisted of 
Kosovar intellectual and military elites and served as a voice for Albanians across Europe and 
the Mediterranean. The League demanded from the Ottomans a democratically-elected 
legislature, the right to organize into local Albanian-run councils and a local judicial system 
based on traditional Albanian codified law. With the power of the diaspora behind them, the 
League of Prizren grew in power and established a short-lived de facto government in Kosovo in 
1880 (Phillips 2012, 31).  Throughout the Kosovo independence campaign from Socialist 
Yugoslavia, the Kosovar Albanian diaspora echoed the same sentiments of their forefathers 
regarding self-determination, mirroring the strong relationship between the diaspora and the 
homeland, and eventually leading to an independent Kosovo. 
 In this chapter, the process of Kosovo diaspora engagement and the independence 
campaign are carefully traced from 1991-2008 using different types of data to measure and 
triangulate evidence for ideological, economic, political and military diaspora engagement. 
These data sources include secondary analysis, content analysis of media sources, lobby 
registers, social media presence and remittance data. The first section covers a discussion of the 
role of the diaspora from 1991 to 2008 and the events leading up to Kosovo’s successful 
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independence. The second section summarizes and analyzes the results of the independence of 
Kosovo from Yugoslavia. 
 
Diaspora Engagement during the Kosovo Independence Campaign: 
 The first signs of Kosovo’s desire for independence from Socialist Yugoslavia began in 
1968, when Kosovar Albanians participated in a major post-war demonstration for self-
determination. Following Tito’s 1974 rewriting of the Yugoslav Constitution, Kosovo was 
granted increased autonomy and upgraded to an autonomous province of Serbia. Kosovar 
Albanians enjoyed a high degree of autonomy within Serbia but slightly less autonomy than 
republics of Socialist Yugoslavia.  The Kosovo Assembly operated with de facto veto power, 
allowing for Kosovar Albanians to prevent the Serbian Republic’s policies from being 
implemented within Kosovo. The first Kosovar Albanian demonstrations for independence from 
Yugoslavia began in 1981, following Tito’s death, and continued throughout the 1980s, as 
university students and grass-roots organizations organized protests across Kosovo (Claybaugh 
2013, 25). In 1987, Slobodan Milosevic became leader of the Serbian Socialist Party, running on 
a platform of Serbian nationalism and intent on reclaiming Kosovo. Milosevic became president 
in May 1989 and the Serbian National Assembly dissolved the Kosovo Assembly and abolished 
Kosovo’s autonomy through a police-monitored vote on March 28, 1990 (Williams 2001). 
 By 1990, the Kosovo diaspora was significantly sized and influential on Kosovo. Two 
factions of diaspora political organizations had emerged: the Popular League for the Republic of 
Kosovo (LPRK) and the Democratic League of Kosovo (LDK), operating out of Switzerland and 
Germany respectively. The LPRK was born in 1985 from nationalism and violence, as the 1981 
university protests spurned hundreds of young Kosovar political exiles fleeing arrest at the hands 
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of the Serbian regime. Seeking to rekindle a strong sense of Albanian nationalism, the young 
exiles formally established the LPRK in Switzerland and the “Planners in Exile” began to make 
contact with militant groups in Kosovo, the “Defenders at Home” (Perritt 2008, 7). Meeting with 
guerilla warfare experts in Vietnam, Algeria and Northern Ireland, the LPRK learned methods of 
attaining weaponry and establishing a fundraising network (Perritt 2008, 8). Through their 
militant connections at home and network of insurgency mentors, the LPRK sought to establish 
an independent Kosovo through guerilla warfare. 
 However, the diaspora-backed LDK took an entirely different approach to political 
engagement that sought to establish an independent state. Following the forced 1989 vote to 
revoke Kosovo’s autonomy, 215 Kosovar Albanian elites, including Kosovar President-in-exile 
Ibrahim Rugova and Prime Minister-in-exile Bujar Bukoshi, initially formed the Democratic 
League of Kosovo in Kosovo to oppose the Serbian measures. Built on Albanian nationalism and 
non-violent protests, the LDK enjoyed a fierce outpouring of support around the Albanian 
diaspora. Diaspora supporters established LDK offices across Europe and North America, with 
fully staffed offices from Toronto to Stuttgart to Melbourne (Hockenos 2003, 185). Back in 
Kosovo, a shadow Kosovo parliament emerged to prevent the passage of the new Serbian 
Constitution. Serbian officials locked out Kosovar legislators, shut down Albanian media sources 
and imposed direct rule over Kosovo by September 1990. As part of the direct rule imposed by 
Milosevic in Belgrade, the LDK was banned in Kosovo and the majority of the Kosovar elite 
was exiled to Slovenia (Hockenos 2003, 187). 
 However, this exile became an opportunity. While Kosovar Albanians in Kosovo worried 
about the leadership losing touch with the struggle at home, the Albanian diaspora across Europe 
welcomed the LDK leaders that they had followed from abroad (Hockenos 2003). The vast 
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network of LDK offices across Europe financed the early government-in-exile’s operating 
expenses, in response to the LDK’s uniting message of non-violence and hope for a Western-
styled independent Kosovo. For the early 1990s, the large, non-violent LDK and the small, 
radical LPRK coordinated efforts, setting up training camps in Albania and creating a small 
stockpile of weapons for a Kosovo guerilla army (Perritt 2008). From 1991 to 1993, the political 
situation of the Kosovar diaspora had coalesced into a powerful alliance between wealthy 
Kosovar Albanians in Europe, influential non-violent political exiles in Slovenia, and young 
Kosovar radicals in Switzerland. 
 Following Belgrade’s reclamation of Kosovo in 1990, the diaspora stepped up its 
economic engagement in order to address the dire economic situation in the homeland.  Kosovar 
Albanians were actively excluded from public employment, as the Serbs attempted to 
“Serbianize” Kosovo, forcing Serbian language instruction in schools and removing most 
Albanians from high income positions. According to The Guardian on August 3, 1992, the 
Serbian government had removed Albanians from nearly 100,000 public sector jobs in Kosovo 
since 1990. Entire households lived on remittances sent from the diaspora (The Guardian 1992) 
and refugees mostly worked as day-laborers to support their families that remained in Kosovo. 
The economy of Kosovo soon became predominantly financed by the Albanian diaspora with the 
establishment of the LDK’s voluntary 3% tax in 1992. Three Percent Committees, established by 
the LDK, supervised the 18 different bank accounts across Europe and the United States that the 
diaspora could send their voluntary tax (Hockenos 2003, 223). Parallel education and medical 
institutions were established with generous donations from the diaspora and the 3% monthly 
income tax, providing both economic and ideological support to the oppressed Albanians in 
Kosovo. 
Zaleski 59 
 
Diaspora Political Engagement 
Despite clear economic support and political activism stemming from the Kosovar 
diaspora, the major victory of the Kosovar diaspora from 1991-1993 was the success of the 
Albanian lobby in achieving non-diaspora political support for Kosovo. In the United States, the 
key group was the Albanian-American Civic League (AACL), established by US Congressman 
Joseph DioGuardi and Jim Xhema, two influential Albanian-Americans seeking US support for 
Kosovo (Phillips 2012, 36). Establishing relations with top Congressional officials, including 
Senator Bob Dole and Congressman Tom Lantos, the Albanian diaspora, through the AACL, 
organized a 1991 congressional trip to Yugoslavia. The trip proved influential, as Dole 
condemned the actions of the Yugoslav Army in Kosovo and requested the deployment of a 
NATO peacekeeping mission to Kosovo in June 1991. Further lobbying led to the creation of the 
Albanian Issues Caucus in 1994 in the US House of Representatives (Phillips 2012, 39). While 
the AACL was clearly influential, additional lobby groups arose and coordinated efforts, such as 
the National Albanian American Council (NAAC), allowing for a powerful, repeated messaging 
campaign, emphasizing the rights of Albanians in Kosovo. 
In total, the United States had five official lobbying organizations oriented towards 
Kosovar Albanians: the Albanian-American Civil League (AACL), the National Albanian 
American Council (NAAC), Alliance for a New Kosovo, Albanian Foundation for Democracy 
and Americans Concerned about Kosovo. While some of these organizations only officially 
lobbied the government for a few years, the AACL played a major role in garnering US support 
for Kosovo and developed some of the most staunch supporters of Kosovo liberation in US 
Congress. Directly as a result of diaspora lobbying, Congressman Elliot Engel created the 
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Albanian Issues Caucus in the House in 1994, which subsequently pushed for the eventually 
unsuccessful “Kosova Self-Defense Act of 1999,” which would have allocated $25 million to 
arm and train the KLA (Phillips 2012). The AACL clearly wielded significant political influence 
in Washington. 
Lobby efforts were not confined to the United States either. The German lobby register 
had at least two Albanian registered lobby organizations active during the independence 
campaign, including the Deutsch-Albanische Wirtschaftsgesellschaft e.V and the Organisation 
Albanischer Studenten und Alumni e.V., both of which supported Kosovo independence in 
Germany (Deutscher Bundestag 2020). Six official Kosovar diaspora lobbying organizations 
registered with the European Union, predominantly following the war, attempting to gain support 
for Kosovo’s admission to the EU and for economic assistance to Kosovo.4 Unofficial lobbying 
was even more effective. Ibrahim Rugova, President of the Kosovar Government-in-Exile, 
strongly advocated for foreign support as part of the LDK’s adoption of non-violent tactics, 
leading to his unofficial title of “Albanian Gandhi'' (Krasniqi 2014). Rugova and the LDK 
lobbied political leaders in Switzerland, France, Germany, the United Kingdom and Austria for 
support for Kosovo. Working with other European governments, the Albanian diaspora 
eventually took the Kosovo issue to the United Nations. As a direct result of Rugova’s meetings 
with Austrian leaders, the Austrian delegation to the UN directly raised their concerns for human 
rights in Kosovo in 1992 in the UNGA. On December 1, 1992, the UNHCR passed a resolution 
demanding that Yugoslav authorities “respect the human rights and fundamental freedoms of 
 
4 These statistics were gathered through keyword searches for relevant terms in the 2020 European Union 
Transparency Register, which is consistently updated. Organizations with connections to Kosovo that 
were established before 2008 were counted as lobbying organizations on behalf of Kosovo. The keywords 
searched for Kosovo were: Kosovo, Kosova, Albania, Albanian, Kosovar, Yugoslav, Yugoslavia, and 
diaspora. 
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ethnic Albanians in Kosovo” (Phillips 2012, 55). On August 20, 1993, the UN Committee on the 
Elimination of Racial Discrimination (CERD) proposed a mission to Kosovo to explore human 
rights abuses (Phillips 2012, 56).  The KLA unofficially lobbied organizations as well, 
particularly in the United States, where official lobbying had laid the groundwork of support for 
their cause. The Kosovar Albanian diaspora had achieved international recognition for Kosovo 
through their successful lobbying efforts. 
From 1991 to 1993, the lobbying efforts of the Kosovar Albanian diaspora had reaped 
significant rewards. International lobbying had increased government awareness of the plight of 
Kosovo in the United States and Europe, diaspora economic engagement resulted in the 
establishment of significant international financing networks, and diaspora military engagement 
led to the creation of training camps for guerilla fighters in Albania. Ideologically, the Kosovo 
government-in-exile was largely united around non-violent pressure on Serbia. However, this 
hopeful dynamic within the diaspora changed from 1993-1996. The organized training camps 
that the LDK and LPRK jointly established were infiltrated by the Yugoslav secret police in 
1993 and the guerilla fighters were quickly arrested or fled into exile (Perritt 2008, 8). The hard 
work of the LPRK since 1985 had fallen apart without a fight. 
Divergent Approaches to Ideological Engagement 
The young radicals of the LPRK regrouped and attempted to recover from the losses in 
1993. The LPRK went fully underground, cutting ties with the LDK and rebranding as the 
Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA). For three years, radical members of the KLA in Switzerland 
recruited members from around the diaspora, reestablished fundraising and logistics networks, 
eliminated Serbian infiltration, and waited for another opportunity to liberate Kosovo. New KLA 
recruits were not difficult to find within the Kosovar Albanian diaspora. Exiles and refugees 
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from Kosovo resented the Serbian regime for their personal treatment and the diaspora had 
absorbed many young people that longed to return to their homeland. Using newspaper articles, 
meetings and flyers, the KLA disseminated Albanian nationalist rhetoric through its networks 
and recruiters, stirring the spirits of those in the diaspora that sought to violently resist the 
Serbian regime and slowly building an army (Perritt 2008, 37). However, for the time being, the 
majority of the diaspora supported the non-violent LDK, partially due to fear of violent 
repercussions from the Serbian secret police or the host country (Perritt 2008, 41). 
Despite the setbacks that the KLA faced, the LDK continued to grow within the diaspora. 
DioGuardi and Xhema’s US coalition continued to gain support from American politicians and 
Rugova’s European campaign also grew. In 1992, the LDK regime had moved from Slovenia to 
Stuttgart, and tapped into the deep pockets of the Kosovar diaspora in Germany. LDK Prime 
Minister Bujar Bukoshi was tasked with financing the parallel government structure established 
in the diaspora and raised $125 million from diaspora Kosovars by 1995 (Hockenos 2003, 222). 
The government-in-exile touted their achievements to the diaspora, adamant that the practices of 
non-violence and strong relations with the United States and Europe would encourage the 
international community to intervene in Kosovo on behalf of the Albanian diaspora. In 
November 1995, the United States hosted the Dayton Accords, a set of peace agreements for 
ending the Bosnian War and creating a framework for Bosnian independence. The LDK was 
certain that Kosovo would be tackled at Dayton and that the international community would 
address the concern over the South Balkans following the Bosnian talks (Hockenos 2003, 237). 
However, the Kosovo issue never arose in Dayton and the concerns of the Albanians were 
ignored. The LDK’s plan of non-violence and advocacy leading to international intervention had 
failed. 
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The Kosovo diaspora did not take this perceived sleight by the international community 
well, which undermined the credibility of non-violent ideological engagement. Mass 
demonstrations in Kosovar Albanian population centers demanded Kosovo independence. 
Protests in Chicago, New York, Detroit, Switzerland and Germany demonstrated the diaspora’s 
displeasure. According to Hockenos (2003), Albanian diaspora activists in Dayton broke through 
the security line and ripped the gates off the hinges at Wright Patterson Air Force Base, where 
the talks were held. The violence marked the end of Rugova and the LDK’s strategy of pacifism, 
as the international community delegitimized the dream of independence through diplomacy 
(Carson 2013). Non-violence failed dramatically and the Kosovar diaspora’s patience wore out. 
Roeder (2018) highlights the need for a successful secessionist movement to practice 
programmatic coordination, where the end goal and intermediary strategic goals are coordinated 
and shared between all components of the campaign. As the LDK lost support following the 
Dayton Accords, support for the KLA grew, highlighting two divergent strategic goals for 
Kosovo, undermining the programmatic coordination argument. 
 
Diaspora Military Engagement: 
The more radical ideological and military approach of the Kosovo Liberation Army now 
had an opportunity to capitalize on the vast resources of the Kosovar diaspora that the LDK had 
dominated for years. Support for the KLA began to grow as an alternative to the LDK and 
Bukoshi, the Prime Minister of the government-in-exile, began working to raise funds for the 
KLA. The Albanian diaspora in Europe began channeling money through the “Homeland Calling 
Fund” to purchase weapons, encourage recruitment and support the KLA (Phillips 2012, 84). 
Initial support was lacking, the KLA had only a few hundred militants and few weapons. 
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However, in November 1996, one year after the Dayton Accords, the Kosovo Liberation Army 
made a public appearance at a funeral for an Albanian killed by the Serbian police in Kosovo. 
With black masks and machine guns, the KLA was greeted with cheers and applause by the 
Albanians in Kosovo that kicked off a guerilla military campaign (Phillips 2012, 81). 
In an effort to better describe diaspora engagement through military support, I 
systematically identified 83 English-language articles from 1991 to 2008 that directly mentioned 
diaspora military support.5 As an example, the New York Times on June 13, 1999, reported that 
“In late April, recruits were said to be pouring in at the rate of 1,000 a day, enthusiastic but 
untrained and unarmed volunteers, most of them from an ethnic-Albanian diaspora numbering 
close to one million.” This large-scale diaspora military engagement was corroborated in the 
literature, as the Kosovo Liberation Army had enough diaspora support to establish a separate 
branch of the KLA, known as the “Atlantic Brigade.” Consisting of mostly second generation 
Albanian-Americans and Albanian-Canadians, the Atlantic Brigade served alongside Kosovar 
citizens in defense of the homeland, attacking Serbian soldiers and volunteering to fight in a 
country that many in the Brigade had never been to before. The failures of the LDK and the 
international community had sparked a belief in many Kosovar Albanians in the diaspora that 
they must take matters into their own hands and use whatever means necessary to achieve 
independence. 
 
5 In order to identify military engagement resources, I utilized the Dow Jones Factiva database, which 
collects global media reports. The search term algorithm used was: 
“Kosov* AND (secession OR secede OR free* OR liberat* OR independen*) AND (diaspora) AND 
(military OR army OR force* OR militia OR recruit* OR fight*) FROM 1/1/1991-1/1/2009” 
1,100 articles were identified as a result of this search; however, after disaggregating unrelated or 
duplicate articles, 206 articles were relevant to this paper. 83 of those articles directly mention different 
actions of diaspora military engagement. 
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While the diaspora was initially wary of the KLA, publicized guerilla warfare attacks 
against Serbian policemen in Kosovo raised morale. As attacks slowly rose in frequency, the 
Homeland Calling Fund began to raise significant funding from the diaspora. According to 
Phillips (2012), the KLA received $1.6 million in cash from a single fundraiser held by the 
Kosovar Albanian diaspora in New York in April 1998. Ibrahim Kelmendi, the German-
Albanian director of the KLA’s “Fatherland is Calling” fund reported the Kosovar diaspora in 
Germany donated $1 million each month of 1998. Recruits continued to arrive in Kosovo, 
prepared to fight for the name of Albanian nationalism. According to Hockenos (2003), the KLA 
hand-distributed recruitment flyers amongst the diaspora and recruited in waves. In April 1998, 
nearly 450 Kosovar Albanians from New York and New Jersey boarded a flight to Kosovo to 
fight Milosevic’s oppression. 
While economic, political, ideological and military diaspora support for the KLA grew 
from 1996 until 1998, the KLA had difficulty controlling territory within Kosovo. Guerilla 
attacks were certainly effective in killing Serbian police officers and soldiers; however, the Serbs 
would retaliate successfully, picking off Kosovar militants and civilians with little discretion. 
The Yugoslav Army from 1996-1999 was the fourth largest army in Europe and brutally efficient 
(Perritt 2008). Fortunately for the KLA, the diaspora provided recruits and funding, and the 
collapse of the Albanian government and pyramid schemes in 1997 meant that a glut of cheap 
weapons was just across the border. Using diaspora funding, the KLA had a nearly endless 
supply of cheap weapons seeping over the Albanian border, as hundreds of thousands of stolen 
government AK-47s were sold to the Kosovo freedom fighters (Perritt 2008). The Kosovo 
Liberation Army, an organization founded in the diaspora and supported by Kosovar Albanians 
around the world, was successfully damaging Milosevic’s Serbian army. 
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One of the competing explanations attributes the success of the Kosovo secessionist 
movement to the high fragility of the Serbian regime. However, using the State Fragility Index as 
a measure for metropole vulnerability, the average fragility of Serbia from 1995 to 2008 was 
8.93 on a scale from 1 to 25 with 25 being the most fragile. During the height of the war from 
1998 to 1999, Serbia was only slightly more fragile than the average, with a vulnerability of 
10/25 and less fragile than Russia, where Tatarstan’s secessionist movement failed. Even 
anecdotally, the Milosevic regime was not particularly weak during this time period, boasting the 
fourth largest army in Europe and remaining politically stable throughout the war. The KLA’s 
success against Milosevic was less a factor of the weakness of the Serbian forces, and more due 
to external diaspora support that enabled successful KLA operations. 
While the war between the Serbian military and KLA raged on in Kosovo, diaspora 
political engagement pressured Western governments and their representatives in the UN to 
intervene on behalf of Kosovo. Germany, Sweden and Switzerland threatened to freeze Kosovar 
accounts in their countries that funded the KLA. The AACL continued to lobby the United States 
to intervene on behalf of Kosovo. Rugova, despite his fall from grace, continued to have a 
sizable following of Kosovar Albanians, and sent a letter on March 16, 1998, to US Secretary of 
State Albright requesting peace talks with Milosevic (Phillips 2012). Under the pressure of 
sanctions, Milosevic reluctantly agreed to meet with Rugova during the summer of his 
counteroffensive against the KLA. The meeting remained largely procedural, but the opening of 
dialogue kept Rugova hopeful that Kosovo could become independent through diplomacy. 
Kosovo lobbying efforts also encouraged the United States and United Kingdom to express 
human rights concerns for Kosovar Albanians at the United Nations Security Council, leading to 
the creation of the Kosovo Verification Mission (KVM) in October 1998. The KVM was tasked 
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with monitoring the October ceasefire between the KLA and the Serbian army and included over 
2,000 unarmed international observers from the Organization for the Security and Cooperation of 
Europe (OSCE). 
Following the resumption of conflict in December 1998, conditions in Kosovo were ripe 
for disaster. The Serbian Army, tasting victory over a weakened KLA, grew more violent against 
the Kosovar Albanians and the KLA regrouped and began a string of guerilla attacks. On January 
15, 1999, in front of an international audience, Serbian forces launched an offensive against 
alleged insurgents in Raçak, a small village in central Kosovo, killing 45 Kosovar Albanians, 
including elderly men, women and a 12 year-old child (Phillips 2012). The Raçak Massacre, as 
the event became known as, showed the world that the KVM had been unsuccessful in 
preventing human rights violations. Eight years after US Senator Bob Dole called for NATO 
peacekeepers in Kosovo, US President Bill Clinton threatened to launch NATO airstrikes against 
the Milosevic regime. Clinton was very familiar with Kosovo, as he met with Rugova on May 
27, 1998 to discuss US support for the Kosovo independence campaign and former Senator Dole 
in September 1998, who had visited Kosovo on a fact-finding mission for an international 
refugee group (Sciolino and Bronner 1999). Amongst other factors, this unofficial lobbying 
contributed to Clinton’s sympathy for Kosovar Albanians and his willingness to act against 
Milosevic. 
After images of the Raçak Massacre covered international media headlines, the United 
States sought one last effort to resolve the conflict diplomatically with pressure from Rugova. On 
January 29, 1999, the United States and European powers summoned the Serbian government 
and the KLA to Rambouillet, France for peace talks. The Kosovar Albanian delegation split 
along partisan lines between the LDK and the KLA. Rugova and Bukoshi were isolated by the 
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KLA leaders, such as Hashem Thaci, as the militants firmly believed that the Rambouillet 
Conference would fail (Phillips 2012). The Kosovar Albanian diaspora watched the proceedings 
with apprehension. Thaci and the KLA were adamant that the agreement must guarantee 
independence, which the Rambouillet Proposal did not; however, American advisors to the 
Albanians convinced the Kosovar delegation to sign the agreement, as Milosevic refused to sign, 
putting Kosovo in the favor of the international community. On February 23, 1999, Milosevic 
officially refused to sign the Rambouillet Proposal and moved more Serbian forces into Kosovo. 
Following the failure at Rambouillet, President Clinton fulfilled his threat and NATO 
began launching airstrikes against Serbian forces on March 24, 1999. Milosevic responded 
violently, lashing out at the Albanian population in Kosovo in a final attempt to “Serbianize” the 
population through ethnic cleansing. Kosovar Albanians fled across the border into co-ethnic 
Albanian homes in Albania and Macedonia. The United States began coordinating efforts with 
the KLA, using the militant group as NATO’s troops on the ground. This major decision was 
brought about through years of hard work by the Kosovar Albanian lobbyists and the KLA, 
pushing American political support in Washington and ensuring that the atrocities of Kosovo did 
not leave the eye of the media (Perritt 2008). In September 1998, KLA commander Florin 
Krasniqi sent a communiqué to individual commanders in the United States, urging them to 
systematically disseminate a message that the Serbs were targeting ordinary civilians. According 
to Perritt (2008, 146), Krasniqi emphasized the need for transparency towards the media, stating 
that “we can win the war with TV cameras; we cannot win it with battles.” American media 
interest intensified, the KLA highlighted Serbian atrocities and, when coupled with LDK and 
AACL lobbying, American officials began coordinating attacks with the KLA in Kosovo. After 
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months of fighting, Milosevic capitulated. The air campaign lasted 78 days before Milosevic 
surrendered on June 9, 1999 (Phillips 2012). 
Another competing explanation for the success of the Kosovo independence campaign 
attributes the success of the Kosovo secessionist movement to the intervention of NATO and the 
United Nations. Some scholars argue that while high diaspora engagement may have contributed 
to the rise of the KLA, Kosovo would never have become independent without the United States 
deciding to unilaterally support the NATO air campaign in 1999. To avoid speculation about 
possible outcomes of the Kosovo War if the United States had not intervened, the role of the 
diaspora in driving US support for an independent Kosovo should not be overlooked. The formal 
and informal Albanian lobby in the United States played a significant role in Washington. The 
AACL, Ibrahim Rugova, Senator Dole, and Representatives Engel, Lantos and DioGuardi all 
furthered an independent Kosovo, gaining audience with President Clinton, utilizing political 
engagement to draw media attention to the Raçak massacre, and setting up the foundation for US 
support in Kosovo. In addition, after the KLA engaged in a media campaign in 1998, NATO 
actively coordinated with KLA ground forces to plan “Operation Arrow,” a guerilla offensive in 
May 1999 that successfully drove Serbian forces out of key areas in Kosovo (Perritt 2008). 
While external support from NATO and the United Nations played a role in Kosovo 
independence, the actions of the diaspora largely contributed to the success of the Kosovo 
secessionist movement and to the involvement of NATO. 
On June 10, 1999, the Security Council adopted Resolution 1244, which called for 
“establishing a secure environment in which refugees and displaced persons can return home in 
safety, the international civil presence can operate, a transitional administration can be 
established, and humanitarian aid can be delivered” (UNSC Resolution 1244, Article 9 C, 1999). 
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The ambiguity of the resolution allowed both parties to claim diplomatic victory, as Kosovo 
became a self-governing state, while the UNSC “reaffirmed...the sovereignty and territorial 
integrity of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.” While the Serbs rejected the UNSC’s 
resolution, they lacked any authority in practice over Kosovo and nearly 50,000 UN 
peacekeepers entered Kosovo on June 20, 1999 (Phillips 2012). 
 
Post-War Diaspora Economic Engagement: 
Following the war, the diaspora’s economic engagement played a major role in laying the 
foundation for an independent Kosovo. Through the help of the diaspora, the interim Kosovar 
government reactivated the “Homeland Calling” and the “Fatherland is Calling” funds in early 
2000. According to a UNFPA survey from February 2000, 36% of the domestic Kosovo 
population was supported by an external private individual (UNFPA 2000, 34).  Personal 
financial connections between family members abroad were the predominant share of the 
Kosovo economy, as over half of the Kosovar population was unemployed. The majority of 
infrastructure projects in Kosovo were constructed with diaspora financing. According to an 
International Monetary Fund report from February 2001, “foreign-financed reconstruction 
inflows for 2000 were estimated to be $360 million, of which about $250 million was for 
rehabilitation of housing and other buildings.” These donor-based constructions amounted to 
significant reconstruction within the country. According to a Wall Street Journal article from 
July 3, 2000,  
“Most of the wealth comes not from locals producing anything, but from two 
steady sources of foreign funds: the Kosovar diaspora and the more than 40,000-
strong international military and civilian presence, which rents the best houses 
and buildings, hires drivers and interpreters and purchases what goods are for 
sale.” (Rafael 2000). 
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The diaspora maintained and rebuilt the economy of Kosovo in the years following the war. 
Diasporan economic support of Kosovo did not stop immediately after the war. Workers 
remittances to Kosovo averaged 18.97% of the total Kosovar GDP from 2004 to 2008. 
Remittances alone, not including the significant investment from the diaspora, contributed 
$771.5 million to the Kosovo economy in 2006, over one-fifth of the Kosovar economy. The 
diaspora constituted a majority of foreign direct investment in Kosovo from the end of the war 
until 2005. The Kosovar Albanian diaspora powered the Kosovo economy following the war, but 
maintained their economic support even up to independence in 2008. 
From 2000 to 2008, the diaspora not only powered the economy of Kosovo, but 
supported the de facto state politically and ideologically. The majority of the new government in 
Kosovo were members of the diaspora, both as political exiles, such as Ibrahim Rugova, and as 
voluntary immigrants, such as Hashem Thaci, who left Kosovo to study in Zurich, Switzerland. 
The major actors of the KLA and the LDK, two organizations founded or operated through the 
diaspora, were placed in charge of the government and the parallel education, healthcare and 
political networks founded in Europe transitioned to domestic institutions within Kosovo. The 
rise of social media contributed to the diaspora connecting with Kosovo as well. At least 
nineteen Facebook groups of Kosovar diaspora members supporting Kosovo’s independence are 
still in use from 2005-2008. Three of these groups, “Independent Kosovo,” “Republic of 
Kosova” and “I Bet I Can Find 3,000,000 People That support Kosovo's Independence,” have 
over 100 members, with 137 members, 795 members and 433 members respectively. Each of the 
nineteen groups connect members of the Kosovar Albanian diaspora around the world and post 
pro-independence rhetoric in the group. For example, on February 25, 2008, one week after 
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Kosovo declared independence, a flurry of posts on the 137-member Facebook page 
“Independent Kosova” echoed similar sentiments of support to user Blake Zenuni:  
“guys, this group has served its purpose, it shouldn't be "appeal for an independent 
kosovo" but "support for an Independent Kosovo" thanks to all of you in this 
group, 8 days of Independence so far! a million more to come!” 
 
The existence of pro-independence Kosovar Albanian diaspora groups offer ideological support 
for independence from abroad, strengthening the resolve of those calling for independence 
within Kosovo. 
On February 17, 2008, the Kosovo Assembly passed the Kosovo Declaration of 
Independence from Serbia. Showing continued ideological support for the movement, 
celebrations were held across Kosovar Albanian communities in Europe and North America. In 
Toronto, thousands of Kosovar Albanians marched to the Ontario Legislature to encourage 
recognition of Kosovo. Fireworks and additional celebrations were held in Switzerland, 
Germany and the United States. After 17 years of fighting for independence, Kosovar Albanians 
finally achieved the establishment of an independent Kosovo. 
 
Analysis of Engagement Results and Considerations of Alternative Explanations: 
 Following the process of Kosovo secession from 1991 to 2008, the Kosovo diaspora 
supported the independence effort in many different types of engagement. Diaspora military, 
economic, political and ideological engagement strengthened the independence movement 
throughout the whole campaign until independence was achieved in 2008. In light of the 
overwhelming engagement of the diaspora in strengthening the independence campaign and 
considering the alternate arguments, the Kosovo case further strengthens the claim that Kosovo 
achieved independence largely due to the existence of a highly engaged diaspora. This section 
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will summarize diaspora engagement through this process, some competing approaches and 
present further analysis of the engagement argument. 
 With regard to political engagement, the key measure of IVIB was the role of diaspora 
lobbying organizations. The Kosovo diaspora led an incredibly successful lobbying campaign in 
the United States and Europe during the secession movement. With multiple lobbying 
organizations and the backing of influential players in Washington DC, the Kosovar Albanian 
diaspora garnered significant support for the independence movement. Ibrahim Rugova 
championed an unofficial lobbying movement, personally meeting with heads of state, directly 
leading to UN actions from Austria, support for the Rambouillet talks and sympathy and support 
from President Bill Clinton and members of Congress. The KLA unofficially lobbied 
organizations as well, particularly in the United States, where official lobbying had laid the 
groundwork of support for their cause. The incessant lobbying by the Kosovar diaspora 
throughout the entire independence campaign kept Kosovo in the forefront of the key regimes 
foreign policy agenda. Political engagement of the diaspora contributed to international 
awareness of the conflict, sympathy for the Kosovar delegation and external funding and 
condemnations of Serbia’s role in the conflict. Each of these factors contributed to a higher 
likelihood of success for the Kosovo independence campaign. As a result, diaspora political 
engagement was highly successful when measured through both official and unofficial lobbying 
measures. 
 With regard to economic engagement, the key measure of IV1B was worker remittances. 
Due to the nature of Kosovo prior to 2002, no official remittances estimates were reported. 
However, official remittance data was captured from 2004 to 2008 and averaged 18.97% of 
Kosovo’s total GDP (World Bank 2018). Additional remittance estimates in 2002 and 2003 from 
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the International Monetary Fund put workers remittances at about 16% of Kosovo GDP. In 
addition, anecdotal evidence shows significant economic engagement from the diaspora to 
Kosovo before the war. The LDK’s voluntary 3% income tax financed the operations of parallel 
government structures from 1991 until 1999. The “Homeland Calling” and “Fatherland is 
Calling” funds raised millions of dollars for the KLA. According to Andrew Higgins and A. 
Craig Copetas writing for the Wall Street Journal on May 20, 1999, the KLA claimed to have 
$250 million to $300 million at their disposal, financed solely by the Albanian diaspora. 
Additionally, following the war, the majority of foreign direct investment in Kosovo came from 
the diaspora, including an estimated $360 million in 2001 for infrastructure projects. While 
official estimates of personal remittances and economic investment from the diaspora are lacking 
before the war, remittance data and anecdotal evidence shows that the Kosovar Albanian 
diaspora was highly economically engaged with Kosovo. In the lead-up to the war, from 1991 to 
1996, the operating costs of the Democratic League of Kosovo were covered by the diaspora, 
allowing for the establishment of medical, educational and governmental institutions that 
eventually formed the foundation for the independent state. During the war, from 1996 to 1999, 
the financing from the diaspora allowed the Kosovo Liberation Army to purchase weapons. 
Following the war, the diaspora strengthened the Kosovar economy until the state became 
independent in 2008. Each of these economic engagements financed each successive milestone 
for the Kosovo independence campaign, strengthening the resilience of the movement and 
leading to a higher chance of success. 
 With regard to ideological engagement, the key measures for IV1B are pro-independence 
social media groups and literature from the Kosovar Albanian diaspora. As stated above, 
nineteen pro-independence diaspora Facebook groups are still active from 2005 to 2008. While 
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these groups highlight only a small fraction of online ideological engagement between the 
diaspora and the homeland, the encouragement from the diaspora to continue fighting for 
independence strengthened the homeland’s independence campaign are clear in these posts. This 
type of connection between Kosovar Albanians around the world encouraged strong nationalist 
rhetoric, encouraged less engaged members of the diaspora to reconnect with their roots and 
emphasized a tight-knit culture of resilience against the Serbian regime. In addition, the 
ideological support for independence encouraged the KLA and LDK to continue fighting, as 
public diaspora support never dwindled, despite occasionally switching alliances between the 
KLA and LDK. The high levels of political engagement acted as the driver for ideological 
engagement, which encouraged further economic and military engagement both in Kosovo and 
in the diaspora, urging Kosovar Albanians at home and abroad to continue fighting until 
independence was achieved. 
 With regard to military engagement, the diaspora also remained highly engaged. The 
KLA purchased nearly all of their weapons with diaspora financing. In a single night at Bruno’s 
in 1998, an Albanian restaurant in New York, the KLA raised $1.6 million in cash from the 
diaspora for weapons. Thousands of second- and third-generation Kosovar Albanian fighters 
arrived in Kosovo to join the KLA, despite never visiting Kosovo before. The sentiments and 
drive behind joining the KLA are clearly highlighted in this interaction between Janine di 
Giovanni, a New York Times journalist, and a KLA medic: 
“‘Why are you here?' I ask a 23-year-old architect, a Kosovar who had been living 
in Switzerland… ‘Why am I here?’ the medic repeats idly, breaking off a piece of 
bread. ‘Because my country is important to me. I believe in what I am doing. I 
believe in the U.C.K. [KLA]’” (di Giovanni 1999) 
 
In this quote, the ideological engagement of the diaspora is clear and has driven a young 
Kosovar-Swiss architect to join the Kosovo Liberation Army. All the forms of engagement work 
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together to create a powerful movement; the ideological engagement encouraged economic and 
political engagement amongst the diaspora, which eventually financed and defended Kosovar 
Albanian military engagement on the international stage. This widespread diaspora support in all 
realms strengthened the diaspora movement, leading to eventual Kosovo independence. 
 Widespread diaspora engagement is further corroborated in a variety of sources that 
claim diaspora support was vital to the success of Kosovo independence. This hypothesis relies 
on evidence from official reports from international organizations and Kosovo (see: Moalla-
Fetini et al. 2004; Office of Hashim Thaçi 2019), media reports (di Giovanni 1999; Rafael 2000), 
academic literature (Hockenos 2003; Perritt 2008), and statements from LDK and KLA 
leadership (see interviews in Phillips 2012). 
 In addition, competing arguments for the success of Kosovo secession are less 
compelling. As mentioned in the process tracing, Serbian vulnerability was fairly low during the 
time of Kosovo’s secession, which undermines arguments that metropole vulnerability is a 
strong predictor of successful independence. In addition, as mentioned in the process tracing 
above, the divide between the KLA and the LDK undermines arguments for programmatic 
coordination as a determinant of success for the Kosovo secessionist movement. While Kosovar 
Albanians were largely united in their goal of independence, the diaspora was largely split on 
how to achieve the goal from 1993-1999.  
Two additional competing explanations for the success of Kosovo are Kosovo’s tactical 
and geographic advantage and Kosovar Albanian grievances, which will be discussed in the 
Tatarstan section below. As a brief overview, Kosovo geographic and tactical advantages played 
a minor role in the eventual success with the exception of international borders, which Tatarstan 
did not have. Kosovar Albanian grievances were heavily utilized to garner short-term support 
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from the diaspora by playing into nationalism and anger towards the Serbian regime, but played 
a lesser role in maintaining diaspora support for Kosovo over the seventeen-year independence 
campaign. These two competing explanations are further discussed in the next section. 
 The argument that Kosovo could not have succeeded without the assistance of NATO 
and the United States is a strong argument. However, as demonstrated in the process tracing 
section above, the high levels of Kosovar Albanian diaspora engagement facilitated the eventual 
US response. As a result, while a secessionist movement may be strengthened by the role of the 
external actor, the state actor may have acted as a direct result of diaspora engagement. Highly 
engaged diasporas can help facilitate external state involvement, as evidenced by events in 
Kosovo. As a result, the external support argument is complementary to diaspora engagement, as 
external support strengthens secessionist success, but is often elicited by diaspora engagement in 
the host country. 
 In Kosovo, the engagement of the Kosovar Albanian diaspora significantly strengthened 
the independence campaign, providing strong evidence that highly engaged diasporas increase 
the likelihood of secessionist success. In the next section, I will investigate if the hypothesis 
remains supported for Tatarstan, which offers a large diaspora with less engagement. 
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Tatarstan 
Size Estimates of the Volga Tatar Diaspora 
Unlike the Kosovar diaspora, the Volga Tatar diaspora did not have a long-standing 
tradition of diaspora-homeland relations. While many in the Tatar diaspora viewed Kazan and 
the Volga Region as their spiritual or cultural homeland, widespread official acknowledgement 
of the Volga Tatars outside of Tatarstan truly began in 1990, following the fall of the Soviet 
Union and a surge of nationalist writings from the Tatar intelligentsia in Tatarstan (Graney 2018, 
161). Prior to 1990, the Tatar diaspora resided in a number of countries, predominantly in the 
former Soviet Union, but also remained in tight-knit communities across Asia and the West. 
These Tatar communities managed to keep their cultural heritage, language and religion, 
establishing cultural organizations and centers around the world. 
Similar to Kosovar Albanians, Volga Tatars are difficult to disaggregate from Crimean or 
Siberian Tatars, as all three sub-groups of Tatar resided in the Soviet Union. However, 
immigrant stocks in key countries can help determine a ballpark size estimate for Volga Tatars 
outside Russia. According to official country censuses, most Volga Tatars live in the former 
Soviet Union, particularly in Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, with significant 
populations in Belarus, Ukraine and Azerbaijan. Smaller populations exist in the rest of Asia, 
Europe and North America, particularly in China, Mongolia, the United States, France, Finland 
and Canada. In total, based on census estimates, 947,547 Volga Tatars lived in the diaspora 
around 2004.6 
 
6 Like Kosovar size estimates, not all censuses fall on the same year. Most censuses, particularly in the 
former Soviet Union, were from 1999. 2004 is an averaged date of all the censuses. 
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In addition, media reports had additional estimates of Volga Tatar diaspora size. 
According to Russian media Business Gazeta (2019), over one million Volga Tatars live abroad, 
with 50,000 living outside the former Soviet Union. According to Kefeli (2012), 100,000 to 
200,000 live outside the former Soviet Union and over four million Tatars live outside Tatarstan. 
As the official immigrant stocks and media reports largely agree that approximately one million 
Volga Tatars lived outside Russia from 1990 to 2007, Volga Tatars make up approximately 
16.7% of the total Volga Tatar population. For comparison, the Kosovar Albanian diaspora 
composed 15-32% of the total Kosovar population during the Kosovo independence campaign. 
As a result, the Tatar diaspora and the Kosovar Albanian diaspora have comparable sizes relative 
to the total global ethnic population. 
From 1990 to 2007, nearly one million Volga Tatars lived outside of Russia. Most of 
these Tatars spoke Tatar and remained aware of their heritage (Graney 2018). However, despite 
these tight-knit Tatar hubs in major cities around the world, there was little connection to any 
specific homeland prior to 1990. The following sections map out the process of Volga Tatar 
diaspora engagement with the Tatarstan independence and sovereignty campaigns from 1990-
2007, utilizing aforementioned measures and multiple sources of data of economic, political, 
ideological and military support to the homeland from this diaspora of similarly large size as 
Kosovo’s. 
 
Tatarstan Process Tracing 
Despite the large diaspora population size and the cultural connection shared by many 
Tatars around the world, no political infrastructure existed to connect Tatars to the homeland 
(Graney 2018). The diaspora of Volga Tatars formed differently than in the Kosovo case, where 
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new waves of Kosovar Albanians arrived in the diaspora every generation and settled in the same 
communities as past waves of Kosovar immigrants, connecting second- and third-generation 
Kosovar Albanians to Kosovo. Yugoslav Kosovar Albanian immigrants of the 1970s mingled 
with Ottoman Kosovar Albanian immigrant communities developed in the 1880s and shared 
stories of the homeland, uniting a continually growing community through nationalism and a 
shared connection to Kosovo. This pattern of waves of immigrants continuously refreshed the 
connection between Kosovo and the diaspora. Until the 1990s, the majority of the Volga Tatar 
diaspora did not have any close political connections to the homeland. Unlike Yugoslavia, which 
allowed emigration of citizens to work abroad, the Soviet Union remained closed, not permitting 
Soviet citizens to leave. As a result, the majority of Volga Tatars abroad in the 1990s were either 
generations removed from Tatarstan and had left Russia in the 1920s or were recent immigrants 
seeking to establish their footing in a new country following the opening of the Soviet Union 
under Gorbachev. As a result, no significant political infrastructure for Tatars existed outside of 
the former Soviet Union to connect them to the homeland (Graney 2018). In the 1990s, the Tatar 
nationalist movement “rediscovered” the Tatar diaspora and began connecting with Volga Tatars 
abroad, but the lack of previous connection meant that channels of communication and a united 
Volga Tatar identity needed to be reinforced quickly to recover from decades of separation. 
The Tatar diaspora “rediscovery” coincided with the Tatar nationalist movement of the 
early 1990s, which sought to establish Tatarstan, a republic of the Russian Federation, as the 
ethnic kin-state of the Tatars. One third of all Tatars lived in Tatarstan and the ethnic make-up of 
Tatarstan was 48.5% Tatar, the largest concentration of Tatars in the world (Kefeli 2012). In 
addition, the capital of Tatarstan was Kazan, the historic cultural homeland of the Tatars. Led 
Zaleski 81 
largely by the Tatar intelligentsia, the nationalist movement centered their agenda around three 
key ideas: Russian imperialism, Tatar exceptionalism and Islamic Jadidism (Hahn 2007). 
With regard to Russian imperialism, Tatar nationalists in the 1990s emphasized the 
Russian assault on the Khanate of Kazan as the early example of Russian colonization. The 
Khanate of Kazan was an independent Tatar state conquered by Ivan the Terrible in 1552 and 
forced to convert from Islam to Orthodox Christianity under the Russian rule.7 Following 
repeated discriminatory practices and forced conversions under generations of Russian Tsars, 
Tatars mobilized in both nationalist and socio-economic uprisings, attempting to throw off the 
yoke of Russian rule (Hahn 2007, 175). The Tatars supported the Bolshevik rise, seeking more 
rights as one of the largest ethnic minorities in Russia; however, these nationalist hopes were 
soon dashed under Stalin’s rule (Hahn 2007, 178). Under Soviet rule, the identity of most Tatars 
reverted to tribal or Soviet affiliations rather than a national Tatar identity, as echoed on July 20, 
1973 in a New York Times article: 
“There is no difference between us and the Russians, really,” a young Tatar 
journalist said enthusiastically, but with some exaggeration. “We are like one 
people (Smith 1973).” 
 
Even following Stalin, despite expanded nationality policies, cultural opportunities for 
Tatars were limited, leading to some members of the Tatar intelligentsia registering a formal 
protest with the Soviet Tatarstan government in 1954 regarding the lack of Tatar schools and 
cultural institutions (Graney 2018, 160). In order to recreate a cultural and national identity, the 
Tatar intelligentsia in the late 1980s began emphasizing the historical significance of the Khanate 
 
7 During this time period, Tatars did not refer to themselves as Tatar, but by a variety of ethnonyms, 
including Kazanis, Bulgars, Mishars or, most commonly in Russia, just Muslims (Rorlich 1986, 5). As a 
result, the statement that the Khanate of Kazan was a “Tatar” state is misleading, as the majority ethnicity 
was a proto-Tatar population. However, Tatar nationalists tended to label the Khanate of Kazan as the 
historical Tatar homeland. 
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of Kazan and building off past nationalist movements. The Tatar intelligentsia in the late 1980s 
and early 1990s also drew further connections to the continued economic and political 
discrimination by the Russian occupiers. Policies of Russification and the migration of Russians 
into Tatarstan fanned the flames of nationalism (Kondrashov 2000). By the fall of the Soviet 
Union, there was an education gap between the Russians and Tatars in Tatarstan, largely due to 
linguistic policies that strongly deterred non-Russian speakers from succeeding on university 
entry exams (Giuliano 2011). The education gap led to an income gap and the Tatar intelligentsia 
used this divide to promote a nationalist agenda to overthrow the Russian “colonists.” 
In addition to promoting the economic and political grievances at the hands of the 
Russians, the Tatar intelligentsia-led nationalist movement furthered ideas of Tatar 
exceptionalism and cultural uniqueness. In 1991, only 1.4% of all Tatar students in Tatarstan 
attended schools that taught in Tatar language (Graney 2018). The intelligentsia sought to 
establish Tatar national-cultural institutions and promoted a revival of Tatar writing, art and 
architecture. Cries for policies of bilingualism, monument restoration and cultural revival 
dominated the nationalist discussion in Kazan in the late 1980s in conjunction with Gorbachev’s 
glasnost policies, which opened opportunities for freer expression. In addition, the intelligentsia 
published studies that showed high rates of inter-marriage between Tatars and Russians and the 
vast majority of children from these marriages were labelled by the government as ethnically 
Russian (Gorenberg 2005). Fearing cultural decline, the nationalist movement emphasized 
economic and political grievances and Tatar exceptionalism, seeking to reverse policies of 
Russification. 
Finally, to a lesser extent, the Tatar nationalist movement emphasized “Islamic 
Jadidism,” a Tatar Islamic movement that promoted freer religious interpretation, a clear secular 
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divide between religion and science and broader education systems (Hahn 2007, 176). Jadidism 
developed in the late nineteenth century in Kazan as a broader political movement amongst the 
Muslim elite that emphasized some aspects of Tatar nationalism and soon dominated Tatar 
mosques and madrasas, driving Tatarstan towards a moderate, secular, Islamic majority (Hahn 
2007, 177). Due to the political nature of jadidism in supporting education reform and 
secularism, mullahs and religious leaders began to make an impact on Tatarstan policies in the 
1880s, including expanding rights for women and the development of cultural, scientific and 
scholarly institutions. Religious promotion of literary and artistic endeavors led to a rebirth of 
Tatar culture in the late nineteenth century and the tradition of jadidism became inherently linked 
to Tatar identity. Under Soviet rule, jadidism was largely abandoned; however, following the 
cultural resurgence of the late 1980s, Tatar nationalists readopted the teachings of Islamic 
jadidism (Hahn 2007, 179). As a result, the Tatar intelligentsia appealed to religious leaders and 
Muslim Tatars in Tatarstan to promote the national movement in the early 1990s. 
The efforts of the nationalist movement were largely successful in mobilizing the 
domestic population within Tatarstan. Feelings of pride about ethnic heritage, anger over Russian 
imperialism, and the traditions of jadidism sparked widespread calls for nationalist reform in 
Tatarstan. According to Hahn (2007), 142 mass demonstrations with nationalist Tatar messages 
occurred in Russia from 1987 to 1993. In October 1991, over 20,000 demonstrators took to the 
streets in Kazan to urge the Supreme Soviet to declare independence (Hahn 2007, 180). 
However, the same fervor for independence was not echoed as virulently abroad. Volga Tatars in 
the diaspora recognized their cultural connections to Kazan; however, no mass demonstrations or 
major engagement efforts developed on the scale of the Tatars within Russia or the Kosovars. 
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In order to determine the explanation for low engagement amongst the majority of the 
Tatar diaspora with the Tatarstan movement, the internal process for the nationalist movement 
must be traced. This section measures the ideological and political engagement of the Tatar 
diaspora through reviewing secondary literature, content analysis of media sources and analyzing 
primary sources. Economic engagement was a challenge to measure, as there is little evidence 
Tatars from abroad sent remittances to Tatarstan. The Tatarstan independence movement never 
became militant, and therefore diaspora military engagement is not measured in this chapter. 
 
Divergent Approaches to Ideological Engagement 
The Tatar nationalist movement, while seeking a similar goal, conflicted with Tatarstan 
President Mintimer Shaimiev’s sovereignty movement, another powerful movement in Tatarstan 
during the same time period. Shaimiev promoted the sovereignty of Tatarstan, and sought to 
become a “union republic” of Russia, which would operate as a de facto state with full economic 
and political autonomy. This goal was similar to the nationalist movement, which predominantly 
sought an independent Tatarstan. However, Shaimiev promoted a “Tatarstani” identity, where 
Tatarstan could operate as a multi-ethnic republic rather than a Tatar nation-state (Graney 2018). 
Shaimiev largely avoided ethnic nationalist rhetoric, which he feared would put off the Russians 
from granting sovereignty, putting him directly in contention with the Tatar nationalist 
movement. 
As a result, much like Kosovo, two approaches towards independence emerged in 
Tatarstan. Shaimiev promoted political nationalism for Tatarstan, supporting a multi-ethnic 
sovereign republic that could be achieved through negotiation (Kondrashov 2000, 110). The 
Tatar nationalist movement, spearheaded by three organizations in Tatarstan, All-Tatar Public 
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Center (VTOTs), Ittifak and Azatlyk, promoted Tatar ethnic nationalism, seeking to create a 
Tatar nation-state and promote Tatarstan as the homeland for all Volga Tatars. Shaimiev’s 
campaign and the nationalists diverged along several dimensions. Unlike the diaspora divide in 
Kosovo between the Kosovo Liberation Army and the Democratic League of Kosovo, which 
shared a joint goal of Kosovo independence, the goals of the two Tatar campaigns differed 
between achieving sovereignty and independence. Shaimiev sought to create a sovereign 
Tatarstan, which would operate largely as an independent state while respecting the territorial 
integrity of Russia, while many in the intelligentsia-led nationalist movement sought an 
independent Tatar nation-state with full territorial split from Russia. In addition, the multi-ethnic 
nature of Tatarstan caused further divergence, as Shaimiev promoted a nomenklatura Tatarstani 
identity for all ethnicities of Tatarstan, while most nationalists in Tatarstan promoted a Tatar 
nation-state for all ethnic Tatars to return. The Kosovo independence campaign never had to 
reconcile a multi-ethnic argument outside of agreements to respect political rights of Serbs and 
ethnic minorities, as the Kosovo population was over ninety percent Kosovar Albanian, whereas 
Tatarstan was only forty-eight percent Tatar. Finally, like the divide between the KLA and LDK, 
the Shaimiev and nationalist camps disagreed on a means of achieving their goal. Shaimiev, as 
President of Tatarstan, sought to achieve sovereignty non-violently, through enacting policies, 
undermining the authority of the Russian regime, and negotiating with Russia and other 
independent countries. Many Tatar nationalists sought to achieve independence through civil 
disobedience or force in some cases. This ideological divergence between Shaimiev and the 
nationalists undermined both movements, as internal struggles for public and diaspora support 
between the Tatar nationalists and the Tatarstan President prevented a united message. 
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The three nationalist organizations varied in radicalism. VTOTs remained the most 
moderate organization. For the early 1990s, VTOTs coordinated efforts with Shaimiev, seeking 
increased autonomy and eventual sovereignty for Tatarstan. Early VTOTs believed 
independence could be achieved through negotiations with Moscow and knew Shaimiev 
maintained influence with Yeltsin. Ittifak and Azatlyk both were more radical. Ittifak promoted 
the creation of a Tatarstan army under the guise of a “national guard” and was prepared to use 
violent separatism to achieve independence from Russia. Seeking to prevent another Chechnya, 
Shaimiev quickly cracked down on radical nationalists, arresting and disarming 623 members of 
the “national guard” in the fall of 1991 (Hahn 2007, 180). Hundreds of weapons were 
confiscated in further raids. Azatlyk operates as a nationalist youth organization, primarily 
promoting Tatar nationalism at universities and schools and organizing mass demonstrations and 
protests. While all three organizations sought to incorporate the Tatar diaspora into the new Tatar 
state, the split strategies for achieving an independent Tatar nation-state appeared to undermine 
the success of nationalism in the eyes of the diaspora. 
The nationalist camp recognized the divide, prompting Tufan Mingnullin, a Tatar 
intellectual writing about nationalism in 1996, to state: 
“Today as well, Tatars are not united. This is why their opinion is not taken into 
account. I do not blame the Russians at all for what we are. Only we are to blame. 
Those who lack self-respect are not respected. A docile slave is beaten more often.” 
(Tanrisever 2002) 
Diaspora Political and Ideological Engagement 
As both the nationalist movement and Shaimiev’s project grew in domestic support, the 
two ideologies eventually reached the diaspora. As president of the Republic of Tatarstan, 
Shaimiev began signing bilateral agreements with independent countries with large Tatar 
populations. Through these agreements, Shaimiev signed agreements with Turkey, Uzbekistan, 
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Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan on a wide variety of topics, including economic, political and 
cultural cooperation. These agreements served a dual purpose; by signing bilateral agreements 
with other countries, Tatarstan was moving closer to gaining recognition of de facto 
independence and also drawing closer relations to the diasporas in those countries, which bought 
external support for Shaimiev’s movement (Graney 2018). The Tatarstan government was 
explicit in their pandering to the diaspora as well. The Tatarstan Prime Minister Sabirov stated 
during the signing of an 1993 agreement with Uzbekistan, “one in ten Uzbek families contains a 
Tatar!” (Graney 2018). In addition to the agreements, Tatarstan deployed “authorized 
representatives” to countries with large diaspora populations, including China, the United States 
and Germany, to act as ambassadors of Tatarstan. These representatives coordinate political and 
economic efforts with the host government, but also support cultural and educational endeavors 
amongst the Tatar diaspora, connecting the diaspora back to Tatarstan (Graney 2018). 
However, despite the official efforts to connect with the Tatar diaspora, Shaimiev limited 
Tatarstan’s engagement with diaspora organizations. The Tatarstan government has been clear 
that Tatarstan only offers “moral and spiritual” support to the diaspora, stating that Tatarstan 
cannot offer cultural or educational support abroad (Graney 2018, 164). The Shaimiev 
administration sought to act as a “coordinator” for the diaspora, connecting organizations abroad 
with other resources for cultural and educational engagement, but Tatarstan itself could not act as 
the benefactor for the Tatar people beyond Tatarstan. These limitations stunted diaspora 
involvement in the sovereignty movement, as Tatarstan failed to act as a Tatar homeland and 
Tatars did not unite abroad. In the minds of many within the diaspora, a homeland should not act 
as solely as a morally supportive, bureaucratic coordinating body (Graney 2018). 
Zaleski 88 
In contrast to Shaimiev’s diaspora policies, the Tatar nationalists established their own 
diaspora programs to encourage diaspora political engagement. In February 1992, Ittifak held a 
Tatar congress or kurultai that drew Tatars from all over Russia and the diaspora. In direct 
opposition to Shaimiev’s government, the kurultai elected a 75-member National Assembly or 
“Milli Mejlis” and issued a declaration of independence (Giuliano 2011). Twenty five  members 
of the Milli Mejlis were elected from outside Tatarstan, including many from the diaspora. While 
the Milli Mejlis held no political power over the Tatarstan supreme soviet, the show of 
international unity of Tatars shook Shaimiev. In addition, Ittifak had rallied public support for 
nationalism in Tatarstan during the fall of 1991. According to public opinion polls conducted in 
November 1991, 86% of Tatars in Tatarstan supported independence (Giuliano 2011). In 
October 1991, armed protestors attempted to storm the supreme soviet in Kazan to force a 
declaration of independence vote (Beissinger 2002). While the attempt was unsuccessful, the 
nationalist rhetoric continued to dominate the airwaves in favor of independence. A common 
nationalist slogan chanted outside the supreme soviet highlights the dual economic grievance and 
exceptionalist bend of the Tatar nationalist movement: “Tatar Oil for Tatarstan” (Datta-Ray 
1993). The creation of the Milli Mejlis successfully appealed to public opinion of the Tatars and 
the attempted declaration of independence with support from elected Tatar diaspora officials 
highlighted ethno-nationalist Tatar unity. Through the Milli Mejlis, which attempted to grant the 
diaspora decision-making power within the Tatarstan legislative process, the nationalists had 
separated the diaspora from the Tatarstan government (Graney 2018, 168). 
However, while some members of the diaspora practiced political engagement by joining 
or supporting the nationalist Milli Mejlis, the measures for lobbying efforts predominantly 
showed indifference. Only one lobbying organization began operating on behalf of Tatar rights 
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between 1990 and 2007 in any reporting country or institution. The Underrepresented Nations 
and Peoples Organization (UNPO) lobbied the European Union to protect the Tatar diaspora in 
Europe beginning in the early 2000s, which provided no support to the Tatarstan independence 
campaign. Shaimiev, like Ibrahim Rugova, practiced some unofficial lobbying; however, his 
efforts remained predominantly in Russia, as he attempted to convince Yeltsin to accept 
Tatarstan sovereignty. 
United public support for the Milli Mejlis did not last for long. In June 1992, Shaimiev, 
seeking to counter the influence of the Milli Mejlis, established the World Congress of Tatars, 
which drew thousands of Tatars around the world to Kazan. While the event remained largely a 
celebration of Tatar culture and heritage, Shaimiev used the opportunity to undermine the Milli 
Mejlis, describing the WCT as an official government organization that could “turn the 
emotional energy surrounding national issues into real work with the diaspora, so it does not 
cause harm” (Graney 2018, 168). However, Shaimiev continued to emphasize that the 
democracy and multiculturalism of Tatarstan came before the Tatar kin-state. 
These two paths split the diaspora. Many diaspora members continued to connect with 
Tatarstan as a cultural resource and coordinating entity to connect communities of Tatars. Tatars 
with this cultural connection predominantly practiced ideological engagement, publicly 
supporting Shaimiev’s vision for a sovereign, multiethnic Tatarstan. This moderate ideological 
engagement with the sovereignty movement is evidenced by the number of Tatar diaspora social 
media groups that developed during this time. Similar to Kosovo, Tatar communities gathered in 
large Facebook groups, supporting Tatarstan sovereignty and cultural exceptionalism. At least 
ten Tatar diaspora Facebook groups from before 2007 are still in use today, with one group, 
“KAZAN RUSYA,” holding 1,183 members. However, calls for independence are nearly non-
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existent and the rhetoric remains more vague than in Kosovar Facebook groups, with milder 
posts such as “Long live the Khanate of Kazan!” rather than calls for independence from Russia 
in the 2007 Facebook group “Tatars Forever.” 
On the other hand, the nationalist camp of the diaspora accused Shaimiev of promoting 
sovereignty for his own self-interest and the interests of the Tatarstan elite, turning his back on 
the diaspora that seek an ethnic homeland (Graney 2018, 169). The WCT and Shaimiev tended 
to operate on an inter-governmental level, rather than on a delegation to delegation level, 
preventing many Tatar diaspora organizations from having any voice in Tatarstan. As a result, 
many in the diaspora accused Shaimiev of using the diaspora only when it was politically 
expedient to do so (Graney 2018). 
 
Initial Success of the Tatarstan Sovereignty Movement 
Despite the divide in diaspora support, both Shaimiev and the nationalists were making 
progress domestically. On August 30, 1990, Tatarstan declared state sovereignty through an 
official vote by the Tatarstan supreme soviet. The conditions in Russia were ideal for Tatar 
independence. Russia was distracted by Chechen separatism in the Caucasus, Russian leadership 
was in turmoil following the attempted coup in August 1991 and nationalist fervor had reached a 
fever pitch in Tatarstan in the fall of 1991. Capitalizing on the opportunity, the Tatarstan 
government held a referendum for Tatarstan sovereignty on March 21, 1992. The referendum 
question remained vague, allowing both nationalists and Shaimiev supporters to back the 
referendum, which asked “Do you agree that the republic of Tatarstan is a sovereign state, a 
subject of international law, building its relations with the Russian Federation and other republics 
(states) on an equal basis?” (AP News 1992). The referendum passed with 62% voting in favor 
Zaleski 91 
of a sovereign Tatarstan, which gave Shaimiev significant bargaining power in negotiations with 
the Russian government. Supporters of a sovereign Tatarstan saw the referendum largely as a 
ratification of the 1990 declaration of sovereignty. 
Russian President Boris Yeltsin became increasingly concerned with the situation in 
Tatarstan. In July 1991, Yeltsin famously dictated to Russia’s republics “take as much 
sovereignty as you can swallow” to gain support for his presidential bid (Kondrashov 2000). 
However, faced with a potentially sovereign Tatarstan in 1992, Yeltsin sought to maintain 
control over the republic. Acting quickly, Yeltsin created the Federation Treaty, which offered 
greater autonomy to the Russian republics in return for respecting the territorial integrity of 
Russia. On March 31, 1992, 18 of the 20 Russian republics agreed to prevent ethnic separatism 
from Russia. However, Tatarstan and Chechnya refused to sign the Federation Treaty and 
relations between Yeltsin and Shaimiev soured. 
The metropole vulnerability argument raises an important contrast between the leadership 
of Serbia and Russia. From 1995 until 2000, Russia had an average state fragility score of 10/25, 
equal to Serbia during the same time period. However, the policies towards minority movements 
during the lead up to these equal fragility scores led to very different outcomes. Milosevic 
resisted Kosovar independence, revoking their autonomy and using force to crush any 
independence campaign. However, Yeltsin granted more autonomy to Tatarstan, co-opting the 
Tatarstan movement and compelling the Tatars to accept sovereignty in lieu of secession. Part of 
the failure of the Tatarstan independence movement was the fast success of the sovereignty 
movement in achieving greater autonomy for Tatarstan, which led to eventual complacency by 
the Tatar independence campaign. Yeltsin also successfully undermined Tatar intelligentsia 
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arguments of Russian colonialism by granting increased autonomy, weakening the ideologies of 
Tatar nationalism. 
In November 1992, the Tatarstan supreme soviet adopted a new constitution and offered 
dual Russian and Tatarstani citizenship for residents of the republic; however, this dual 
citizenship was not extended to the diaspora (Giuliano 2011, 124). Yeltsin organized nationwide 
referendums for reform policies in 1993. Tatarstan urged citizens to boycott the vote, drawing 
less than 15% of the Tatar population to the polls. The same happened for nationwide Russian 
Duma elections in late 1993 (Giuliano 2011). Tatarstan also refused to ratify the new Russian 
Constitution in 1993, recessed the supreme soviet of Tatarstan to prevent votes and often 
publicly contradicted the official stances of the Russian government (Smith 2013).8 Tatarstan 
increasingly rejected the authority of Russian leadership and continued to negotiate for 
sovereignty. In order to gain leverage over Russia, Shaimiev withheld tax revenue and continued 
to urge the Tatarstan population to boycott federal votes. 
In February 1994, Shaimiev’s campaign came to fruition. After nearly two years of 
negotiation, Yeltsin yielded and a bilateral power-sharing treaty was agreed upon by both 
leaders. Under the 1994 agreement, Tatarstan’s federal tax rate dropped nearly 70%, their 
economic and political autonomy greatly expanded and Tatarstan citizens could opt out of the 
Russian military requirement (Jeffries 2013, 83). Shaimiev did a victory lap in Kazan, 
proclaiming that his policies led to peaceful and successful sovereignty for Tatarstan. Shaimiev 
began consolidating political power in Tatarstan, pushing aside opposition and nationalist 
groups, gerrymandering districts and running negative press campaigns (Giuliano 2011, 125). 
 
8 Interestingly, Shaimiev publicly contradicted the Russian government on Kosovo secession. Russia 
supported the Serbian regime and committed peacekeepers to the region. Tatarstan supported the Kosovar 
rebels and refused to commit any peacekeepers to the Russian force. 
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The nationalist groups crumbled. VTOTs lost the vast majority of its public support and 
leadership and moderate widespread nationalism was replaced with fringe radicalism seeking 
violent Tatar independence. Ittifak and Azatlyk became increasingly factionalized, becoming 
smaller and smaller organizations (Giuliano 2011). The diaspora no longer could connect with 
the nationalist movement and the vast majority maintained connections to Tatarstan through 
domestic cultural organizations and the WCT. Nearly all calls for independence dried up as 
Shaimiev declared victory for Tatarstan, successfully co-opting key elements of nationalist goals, 
removing the majority of the secessionist platform. 
In addition, while the Tatar diaspora connected with the Shaimiev regime through 
ideological engagement, the levels of engagement between Kosovar Albanians and Tatars were 
vastly different. Using similar search terms on Factiva, I found 206 articles regarding separate 
instances of Kosovar diaspora engagement, in comparison with 11 articles for Tatar diaspora 
engagement.9 The vast majority of these articles discussed meetings between diaspora groups 
and the WCT and forms of ideological engagement. There were no articles that discussed 
economic or military diaspora engagement. In addition, the lack of articles cannot be explained 
by an increased incentive for the Tatar diaspora to engage with the independence campaign 
covertly to avoid punishment, as the incentive would be similar to the Kosovar Albanian 
diaspora. Both the Yugoslav and Russian regimes were capable of and willing to target political 
dissidents and secessionist enablers abroad, which should decrease the incentive for either 
 
9 In order to identify media reports on Tatar diaspora engagement, I utilized the Dow Jones Factiva 
database, which collects global media reports. The search term algorithm used was: 
Tatar* AND (secession OR secede OR free* OR liberat* OR independen*) AND (diaspora OR exile*) 
AND (Kazan OR Volga) NOT (Crimea*) FROM 1/1/1990 to 1/1/2008 
The eleven articles were disaggregated from duplicates in the same process as the Kosovo articles. 
Zaleski 94 
diaspora to engage with the homeland. As a result, the Tatar diaspora was significantly less 
connected to Tatarstan than the Kosovar Albanians were to Kosovo. 
The Shaimiev administration expanded land reform, economic and education measures in 
order to prevent Russia from easily reclaiming Tatarstan sovereignty. From 1994 until 1999, 
Tatarstan successfully operated as a sovereign state within the parameters of Russia. The 
geography of Tatarstan may have acted as a constraint to Tatarstan’s full independence. The 
Republic of Tatarstan is completely surrounded by the Russian Federation, which would prevent 
goods or weapons from entering Tatarstan through a non-Russian border, in case Tatarstan 
sought violent independence. Kosovo, which borders Albania, Montenegro and Macedonia in 
addition to Serbia, had a number of other countries to support their independence. However, 
despite these geographic constraints, Yeltsin still feared Tatarstan secession as a significant 
threat. The Shaimiev government studied other surrounded countries, such as San Marino, as 
potential models for their sovereignty model and believed that Tatar sovereignty would remain 
successful despite their geographic situation (Burke 1993). 
 
The Fall of Tatarstan Sovereignty 
The rise of Putin and Russian federalism’s fall from grace soon marked doom for the 
sovereignty movement. Putin was not Yeltsin. Through a series of unilateral legal actions, the 
Duma under Putin began withdrawing Tatarstan sovereignty. Shaimiev attempted the same 
actions as before: withholding tax revenue, supreme soviet recesses and refusals to meet with 
Russian officials. However, the Putin regime was prepared to engage in constitutional warfare, 
declaring that all republic constitutions must be harmonized with the Russian Federation’s 
constitution by June 2000 (Hahn 2007). Tatarstan and Shaimiev continued to delay, making 
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minor adjustments to the constitution to buy more time. Shaimiev claimed that Tatarstan could 
not reasonably amend the Tatarstan Constitution until after the March 2002 presidential 
elections. Putin renewed pressure on Tatarstan immediately following Shaimiev’s reelection and 
on May 10, 2002, the Tatarstan supreme soviet acquiesced, amending the Tatarstan Constitution 
to include Tatarstan as a “subject of the Russian Federation” (Hahn 2007, 190). 
In addition to engaging in constitutional warfare, the threat of military force under the 
Putin regime acted as a deterrent for the Shaimiev regime. In 1999, Putin had deployed Russian 
forces in Chechnya to quash the Chechen independence movement and Tatar leaders feared he 
would use indiscriminate force against Tatarstan if they did not comply. As a result of this 
concern, Shaimiev refused to reach out to radical nationalist organizations for assistance and 
moderate nationalist campaigns led by the intelligentsia had largely died out (Hahn 2007). There 
were a number of protests in Tatarstan following the 2002 amendments, but the public support 
for nationalism was gone after the Tatar nationalist movement fragmented following Shaimiev’s 
co-opting of the secessionist platform (Giuliano 2011). Putin continued to withdraw power from 
the Russian republics and by March 31, 2004, Tatarstan had lost all special autonomous status. 
The Tatarstan sovereignty movement had failed. 
On July 11, 2007, as a largely symbolic gesture, the Russian and Tatar governments 
signed another power-sharing agreement. However, unlike the 1994 power-sharing agreement, 
which granted Tatarstan economic and political sovereignty, Tatarstan was granted some 
autonomy over only cultural and educational affairs (Arnold 2007). This 2007 agreement marked 
the true end of the Tatarstan sovereignty campaign that began in 1990, as it represented a 
complete reversal of the leverage that Shaimiev managed to gain over Yeltsin’s regime. 
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Analysis of Engagement Results and Considerations of Alternative Explanations: 
 With the exception of the first few years of the sovereignty movement when the diaspora 
practiced political engagement through the Milli Mejlis and other nationalist organizations, the 
Tatar diaspora remained involved largely through shared culture. The lack of historical relations 
between the diaspora and the homeland, Shaimiev’s emphasis on the “coordination” role of 
Tatarstan and the lack of diaspora political infrastructure in the host countries made supporting 
the Tatarstan movement politically, economically or militarily difficult from abroad. The WCT 
intensified cultural relations between communities greatly and many Tatars supported the 
sovereignty movement through ideological engagement. However, as Shaimiev lost power, the 
WCT became a largely Russian governmental institution for Tatar culture and history. The 
nationalist movement failed to create a strong enough homeland relationship to the diaspora, 
causing the duration of diaspora support for Tatarstan secession to be very short-lived. Without 
diaspora encouragement, Shaimiev’s base of support for sovereignty failed under Putin, as Tatars 
within Tatarstan and Russia likely feared retaliation for defending Tatar sovereignty. 
 There are a number of competing explanations for Tatarstan’s failure to secede from 
Russia. Despite higher Russian metropole fragility than in Serbia, Shaimiev and Yeltsin were 
able to co-opt the platform of the nationalist secessionist movement in Tatarstan by promoting 
increased autonomy in Tatarstan. The Tatar nationalist movement largely fell apart in 1994, 
following the signing of the power-sharing agreement, allowing Putin to eventually revoke 
Tatarstan’s sovereignty without significant challenges. However, according to the state fragility 
index, Russia was more fragile under Putin’s regime from 1999-2002 (10.5/25 average) than 
under Yeltsin’s regime from 1995-1999 (9.75/25 average), undermining the importance of state 
fragility to success of secessionist movements. 
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 In addition, the geography of Tatarstan may have limited the potential for Tatarstan to 
secede. In Kosovo, multiple international borders allowed for weapons, aid and goods from the 
diaspora to assist in strengthening the independence movement. However, in Tatarstan, the lack 
of an international border may have stifled secessionist movements. While initially confident that 
Tatarstan would not seek independence, Yeltsin became increasingly concerned with the 
potential for Tatarstan to become independent, as Tatars constitute the second largest ethnic 
group in Russia and have significant economic resources that could allow them to become 
independent (Hahn 2007, 174). Yeltsin’s genuine concern for Tatarstan secession partially 
undermines the argument that geography alone would prevent a successful independence 
campaign, as Yeltsin could rely on the lack of international borders to stifle the Tatar movement.  
While both Shaimiev and nationalist leaders were acutely aware of Tatarstan’s geographic 
situation, nationalist organizations continued to study other landlocked countries or 
independence campaigns, such as San Marino and Nagorno-Karabakh, in case of the necessity 
for violent secession. Ultimately, this argument is largely hypothetical. The borders of Tatarstan 
never closed throughout the campaign and no violent secession occurred, so the geography of 
Tatarstan played a minimal role in the actual campaign. While this fact does not undermine the 
possibility that the lack of an international border would have significantly stifled any violent 
secession, the largely peaceful nature of the movement, Tatarstan nationalist’s preparation for a 
surrounded secession movement, and Yeltsin’s concern with Tatar secession undermine the 
argument that international borders alone prevented the success of the Tatarstan campaign. 
 Unlike Kosovo, Tatarstan did not receive any external support from other independent 
countries for their independence campaign. However, Tatarstan did not have a highly politically 
engaged diaspora that may have motivated other countries to assist the Tatarstan independence 
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movement. The effect of external support on independence remains consistent with the results 
from Kosovo that external support acts as a complementary explanation to diaspora engagement.  
External support strengthens independence campaigns; however, diaspora engagement in the 
host country often triggers the external government support. 
 With regard to the grievance argument, the Tatar nationalist campaign centered much of 
their platform on emphasizing Tatar grievances with Russian “colonists.” However, the public 
support of Tatar nationalism spiked in 1992 and did not successfully endure throughout the 
independence campaign, highlighting the weaknesses in the grievance argument. Both 
independence campaigns in Tatarstan and Kosovo heavily emphasized economic and political 
grievances within their societies; however, the Kosovo campaign was able to endure, while the 
Tatarstan campaign failed, pointing to other explanations for secessionist success. While 
emphasizing economic and cultural grievances was a successful motivator in the short term, the 
failure of the Tatar national movement to garner long-term public support through emphasizing 
grievances against Russians undermines the argument that domestic grievances increase the 
likelihood of secessionist success. 
 Finally, with regard to Roeder’s programmatic coordination approach, Tatarstan supports 
the argument that internal divisions between key movement actors lessens the likelihood of 
secessionist success. While the Tatar nationalist movement successfully established 
programmatic realism and authenticity in Tatarstan, Shaimiev and the nationalists competed for 
support and failed to coordinate the methods and goals of the independence and sovereignty 
movements. However, Kosovo, as mentioned above, seems to undermine Roeder’s argument, as 
the KLA and the LDK failed to coordinate methods and resources, but still achieved 
independence for Kosovo. 
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 In light of the competing and complementary explanations, as well as the evidence that 
almost one million Tatars living outside of Russia did not sufficiently engage with the Tatarstan 
independence movement, Tatarstan demonstrates that a lack of diaspora engagement 
significantly lessens the likelihood of secessionist success. Tatarstan remains consistent with the 
results of the Kosovo case. In the next and final section, I will compare and contrast the results of 
Kosovo and Tatarstan, summarize the competing arguments and offer my recommendations for 
future diaspora research. 
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Conclusion 
 Kosovo and Tatarstan are systematically selected cases that test effectively the diaspora 
engagement argument. The Kosovar Albanian diaspora engaged with the Kosovo independence 
campaign politically, militarily, economically and ideologically, strengthening the movement 
and increasing the likelihood of secessionist success. The Volga Tatar diaspora failed to engage 
with the Tatarstan independence campaign in any significant capacity, with the exception of 
some ideological engagement, weakening the movement and decreasing the likelihood of 
secessionist success. Both diaspora populations were large and culturally aware of their heritage; 
however, the two independence movements greatly differed on the use of the diaspora. 
 Mintimer Shaimiev and Ibrahim Rugova promoted nonviolence, unofficial lobbying and 
negotiation to achieve their respective goals of sovereign Tatarstan and independent Kosovo. 
However, Shaimiev undermined the role of Tatarstan as an ethnic homeland, promoting a multi-
ethnic, sovereign state, which muddied his connection to the diaspora. While Shaimiev 
established the World Congress of Tatars to connect the Tatar diaspora to Tatarstan, he also 
deemphasized supporting the diaspora in ways other than “morally and spiritually” and was often 
accused of using the diaspora as a political tool rather than a means to sovereignty (Graney 
2018). In contrast, Rugova emphasized the role of Kosovo as the ethnic homeland for Kosovar 
Albanians and the LDK utilized strong nationalist rhetoric to engage the diaspora. Shaimiev 
actively undermined any sense of “return” for the Tatar diaspora to Tatarstan, whereas Rugova 
encouraged the diaspora to invest in their futures in Kosovo. While Shaimiev and Rugova 
promoted the same methods, their connection to the diaspora vastly differed, with Rugova using 
diaspora engagement to strengthen the Kosovo independence movement and Shaimiev failing to 
strengthen the Tatarstan movement. 
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 In addition, both movements had radical components: the Kosovo Liberation Army for 
Kosovo and the intelligentsia-led Tatar nationalist movement in Tatarstan, which consisted of a 
number of organizations, including VTOTs, Ittifak and Azatlyk. All of these organizations 
actively competed with the non-violence movements led by Shaimiev and Rugova; however, 
once again, the role of the diaspora led to different outcomes. The KLA initially worked with 
Rugova and the LDK until the Dayton Accords, when the KLA and many in the diaspora 
realized that non-violence was not working. The KLA offered new methods of achieving the 
same goals as the LDK and successfully co-opted a significant chunk of Rugova’s support. 
While the KLA actively disliked Rugova and the LDK, which became clear at Rambouillet, the 
non-violent movement laid the groundwork for the KLA movement. When public diaspora 
support transitioned to violent separatism, the KLA could easily take the reins from Rugova. On 
the other hand, Shaimiev and the Tatar nationalist movement simultaneously competed for 
diaspora support throughout the independence campaign. Diaspora engagement was split 
between the two camps and further split between multiple organizations in the nationalist camp. 
Ultimately, Shaimiev’s political power as president of Tatarstan won out over the disorganized 
nationalists, the diaspora lost interest as the independence movement was co-opted by the 
sovereignty movement and Tatarstan settled for less than five years of increased autonomy. The 
inability to channel diaspora engagement to strengthen the movement undermined any political 
power of the Tatar independence campaign. 
 These two parallel stories of large diasporas in the 1990s raise an important question that 
deserves future attention: Which actors most effectively create a national identity and motivate 
an engaged diaspora? In the case of Kosovo, the national identity of Kosovar Albanians had been 
created over centuries of cultural differences from the ruling class of Ottoman Turks or Serbians. 
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In the case of Tatarstan, the Volga Tatar identity was not fully formed until the late nineteenth 
century, where it was subsequently lost under the Soviet Union and rediscovered in the late 
1980s. In either instance the question remains for the success of secessionist movements: should 
the diaspora reach out to the homeland to establish connections or vice versa? 
 In addition, a discussion of the competing and complementary arguments is necessary in 
understanding the diaspora engagement argument. With regard to metropole vulnerability, the 
state fragility of the regime did not seem to matter as much as the policies enacted by the 
metropole leader. In Serbia, which had lower regime fragility than Russia, Milosevic resisted 
Kosovar independence efforts with force, attempting to quash the secession efforts. The 
Milosevic regime was not particularly vulnerable; however, his violent display of force 
strengthened diaspora engagement, as new waves of refugees spread stories and anger 
throughout an already active diaspora. However, Yeltsin, fearing Tatarstan secession from a 
more vulnerable Russia, granted increased autonomy to Shaimiev’s regime, bolstering the 
sovereignty movement and allowing Shaimiev to co-opt the efforts of the nationalists that sought 
independence. As a result, the vulnerability of the regime worked in the opposite way than 
expected, as vulnerability led the metropole to offer compromises that undermined more radical 
demands for secession. 
 With regard to geographic or tactical advantages, only international borders seemed to 
play a role in the outcome of either campaign. Tatarstan had no international borders, which 
likely played a role in undermining secessionist efforts. However, as stated above, the non-
violent nature of the campaign and the genuine concern over Tatar secession from Russian 
authorities point to additional explanations for secessionist failure outside of lacking 
international borders. On the other hand, Kosovo had international borders, which the KLA used 
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at the outset of the independence campaign to build training camps in Albania. In addition, the 
majority of KLA weaponry was purchased from Albania across the border. However, once again, 
international borders alone did not lead to Kosovo secessionist success, as neighbors were often 
unwilling to act with the KLA for fear of retaliation and the ability to more easily import 
weapons than Tatarstan played a smaller role than other explanations in leading to Kosovo’s 
independence. As a result, while international borders played a role in the outcome of the 
secessionist campaign, the role of other explanations likely took precedence in leading to 
secessionist success. 
 With regard to grievances, there is significant evidence in both cases that anger at the 
treatment of the homeland at the hands of the metropole was significant in bolstering temporary 
support. However, there is little evidence that the temporary support led to eventual secessionist 
success. In Tatarstan, the nationalist movement heavily emphasized Tatar economic and political 
grievances with the Russian government and Russians in Tatarstan. However, despite a peak of 
public support for Tatar nationalism in 1992, these efforts to construct grievances largely failed 
following Shaimiev’s success with the power-sharing agreement in 1994. In Kosovo, the 
nationalist movement was largely constructed on grievances with the Milosevic regime, but also 
based on a culture of resistance within the Kosovar Albanian diaspora (Phillips 2012). As a 
result, while grievances are a successful short-term nationalist motivator, nationalism constructed 
around grievances does not appear to successfully endure in the long-term. 
External government support acted as a complementary argument to diaspora 
engagement. In Kosovo, the support from the United States and NATO assisted in increasing the 
likelihood of independence in Kosovo; however, lobbying efforts from Rugova, the Albanian-
American Civic League and other Kosovar Albanians led to the support of the US and NATO. 
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As stated in the Kosovo section, the diaspora played a significant role in influencing top US 
officials to intervene on behalf of Kosovar Albanians in Serbia. In addition, the lack of Tatar 
diaspora engagement and lobbying in host countries, in addition to external governments’ 
unwillingness to challenge the territorial integrity of a resource-rich and nuclear-armed Russia, 
may have contributed to the lack of external support for Tatarstan. 
 Finally, the last competing explanation for the success of Kosovo and the failure of 
Tatarstan is Roeder’s programmatic coordination argument. Roeder’s argument certainly applies 
to Tatarstan, as a lack of coordination with regard to goals, methods and messages between 
Shaimiev and the nationalist movement led to a weakened independence campaign. However, 
the LDK and the KLA did not successfully coordinate independence efforts during the vast 
majority of the Kosovo campaign. Roeder (2018) argues that a successful campaign maintains 
the same end goals and strategic goals throughout the campaign. While the LDK and the KLA 
maintained the same end goals of successful independence, the intermediary strategic goals were 
vastly different, as Rugova sought to build a coalition of supportive countries that would 
pressure Milosevic to grant Kosovo independence and the KLA sought to achieve independence 
through violent separatism. As a result, Roeder’s programmatic coordination acts as a weaker 
competing argument in the case of Kosovo. 
 
Suggestions for Further Research 
 This study provided a fresh and in-depth look at the relationship between the diaspora 
and secessionist movements and offered strong evidence that diaspora engagement plays a 
significant role in increasing the likelihood of secessionist success. However, this study was 
limited in scope. This thesis is not a large and quantitative study of global secessionist 
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movements, which would provide a wider look at national secessionist movements and diaspora 
engagement. By conducting a broader quantitative study of all national secessionist movements, 
the findings on the relationship between diaspora engagement and secessionist success would 
become more clear and generalizable. In addition, additional measures of engagement should be 
included in further studies. Political engagement is not limited to lobbying efforts alone and 
should include data regarding protests and mass demonstrations. Ideological engagement 
measures should include broader media measures, including radio stations and direct interviews 
with diaspora members. While the data is largely inaccessible, economic engagement should 
include complete direct donation amounts to independence campaigns, as well as the number of 
donors. In addition, further searching should be conducted in the native language, as only some 
Albanian and Tatar sources were included in this thesis. Expanding the measures of engagement 
creates a clearer picture of the effect of the diaspora on secessionist campaigns. 
 This study raises some new areas within diaspora studies that should be further explored. 
Firstly, it is tantamount to remember that diasporas are non-monolithic entities and factions 
within diaspora communities may affect choices to engage with the homeland or avoid 
engagement. Further studies should explore diaspora factionalization and decision-making to 
understand what prompts members of a diaspora to support or not support secessionist 
campaigns. In addition, this study does not differentiate between the role of the diaspora during 
non-violent or violent secessionist movements. Further studies should explore the relationship 
between diasporas and violent separatism. 
 This study provides a unique contribution to understanding and explaining secessionist 
success. The paper offers a foundation for scholars to build on and more rigorously test this new 
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contribution of the importance of systematically measured diaspora engagement in the success of 
secessionist movements. 
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